Статус Конвенции о запрещении разработки, производства, накопления и применения химического оружия и о его уничтожении (Париж, 13 января 1993 года) [рус., англ.]

[неофициальный перевод]

СТАТУС КОНВЕНЦИИ О ЗАПРЕЩЕНИИ РАЗРАБОТКИ, ПРОИЗВОДСТВА, НАКОПЛЕНИЯ И ПРИМЕНЕНИЯ ХИМИЧЕСКОГО ОРУЖИЯ И О ЕГО УНИЧТОЖЕНИИ (ПАРИЖ, 13 ЯНВАРЯ 1993 ГОДА)

(по состоянию на 29 октября 2026 года)

Вступление в силу: 29.04.1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION Geneva, 3 September 1992

Status as at: 29-10-2026

Note: At its 635th plenary meeting on 3 September 1992 held in Geneva, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the «Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament», including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, contained in the Appendix to the Report. At its 47th session held in New York, the General Assembly, by resolution A/RES/47/39 <1> adopted on 30 November 1992, commended the Convention. In the same resolution, the General Assembly also welcomed the invitation of the President of the French Republic to participate in a ceremony to sign the Convention in Paris on 13 January 1993 and requested the Secretary-General, as Depositary of the Convention, to open it for signature in Paris on that date. The Convention was opened for signature in Paris, from 13 January to 15 January 1993. Thereafter, it remained open for signature at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York, until its entry into force, in accordance with article XVIII.

DECLARATIONS AND RESERVATIONS (Unless otherwise indicated, the declarations and reservations were made upon ratification, acceptance, accession or succession.)

Austria

Declaration:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Belgium

Declaration made upon signature and confirmed upon ratification:

As a Member State of the European Community, the Government of Belgium will implement the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in accordance with its obligations arising from the rules of the Treaties establishing the European Communities to the extent that such rules are applicable.

China

Upon signature:

Declarations:

«I. China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons and their production facilities. The Convention constitutes the legal basis for the realization of this goal. China therefore supports the object and purpose and principles of the Convention.»

II. The object and purpose and principles of the Convention should be strictly abided by. The relevant provisions on challenge inspection should not be abused to the detriment of the security interests of States Parties unrelated to chemical weapons. Otherwise, the universality of the Convention is bound to be adversely affected.

III. States Parties that have abandoned chemical weapons on the territories of other States parties should implement in earnest the relevant provisions of the Convention and undertake the obligation to destroy the abandoned chemical weapons.

IV. The Convention should effectively facilitate trade, scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes. All export controls inconsistent with the Convention should be abolished.»

Upon ratification:

Declarations:

1. China has always stood for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. As CWC has laid an international legal foundation for the realization of this goal, China supports the purpose, objectives and principles of the CWC.

2. China calls upon the countries with the largest chemical weapons arsenals to ratify CWC without delay with a view to attaining its purposes and objectives at an early date.

3. The purposes, objectives and principles of CWC should be strictly observed. The provisions concerning challenge inspection shall not be abused and the national security interests of States parties not related to chemical weapons shall not be compromised. China is firmly opposed to any act of abusing the verification provisions which endangers its sovereignty and security.

4. Any country which has abandoned chemical weapons on the territory of another country should effectively implement the relevant CWC provisions, undertake the obligations to destroy those chemical weapons and ensure the earliest complete destruction of all the chemical weapons it has abandoned on another state's territory.

5. CWC should play a sound role in promoting international trade, scientific and technological exchanges and cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical industry. It should become the effective legal basis for regulating trade and exchange among the states parties in the field of chemical industry.

Cuba

Declarations:

The Government of the Republic of Cuba declares, in conformity with article III (a) (iii) of the Convention, that there is a colonial enclave in its territory — the Guantanamo Naval Base — a part of Cuban national territory over which the Cuban State does not exercise its rightful jurisdiction, owing to its illegal occupation by the United States of America by reason of a deceitful and fraudulent Treaty.

Consequently, for the purposes of the Convention, the Government of the Republic of Cuba does not assume any responsibility with respect to the aforesaid territory, since it does not know whether or not the United States has installed, possesses, maintains or intends to possess chemical weapons in the part of Cuban territory that it illegally occupies.

The Government of the Republic of Cuba also considers that it has the right to require that the entry of any inspection group mandated by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to carry out in the territory of Guantanamo Naval Base the verification activities provided for in the Convention, should be effected through a point of entry in Cuban national territory to be determined by the Cuban Government.

The Government of the Republic of Cuba considers that, under the provisions of article XI of the Convention, the unilateral application by a State party to the Convention against another State party of any restriction which would restrict or impede trade and the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other purposes not prohibited under the Convention, would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.

The Government of Cuba designates the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, in its capacity as the national authority of the Republic of Cuba for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as the body of the central administration of the State responsible for organizing, directing, monitoring and supervising the activities aimed at preparing the Republic of Cuba to fulfil the obligations it is assuming as a State party to the aforementioned Convention.

Denmark

Upon signature:

Declaration:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

France

Upon signature:

Declaration:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Germany

Declaration made upon signature and confirmed uponratification:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Greece

Declaration made upon signature and confirmed uponratification:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Holy See

Declaration:

[...] the Holy See, in conformity with the nature and particular condition of Vatican City State, intends to renew its encouragement to the International Community to continue on the path towards a situation of general and complete disarmament, capable of promoting peace and cooperation at world level.

Dialogue and multilateral negotiation are essential values in this process. Through the instruments of international law, they facilitate the peaceful resolution of controversies and help better mutual understanding. In this way they promote the effective affirmation of the culture of life and peace.

While not possessing chemical weapons of any kind, the Holy See accedes to the solemn act of ratification of the Convention in order to lend its moral support to this important area of international relations which seeks to ban weapons which are particularly cruel and inhuman and aimed at producing long-term traumatic effects among the defenceless civilian population.»

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Declarations:

«The Islamic Republic of Iran, on the basis of the Islamic principles and beliefs, considers chemical weapons inhuman, and has consistently been on the vanguard of the international efforts to abolish these weapons and prevent their use.»

1. The Islamic Consultative Assembly (the Parliament) of the Islamic Republic of Iran approved the bill presented by the Government to join the [said Convention] on 27 July 1997, and the Guardian Council found the legislation compatible with the Constitution and the Islamic Tenets on 30 July 1997, in accordance with its required Constitutional process. The Islamic Consultative Assembly decided that:

The Government is hereby authorized, at an appropriate time, to accede to the [said Convention] — as annexed to this legislation and to deposit its relevant instrument.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must pursue in all negotiations and within the framework of the Organization of the Convention, the full and indiscriminate implementation of the Convention, particularly in the areas of inspection and transfer of technology and chemicals for peaceful purposes. In case the afore-mentioned requirements are not materialized, upon the recommendation of the Cabinet and approval of the Supreme National Security Council, steps aimed at withdrawing from the Convention will be put in motion.

2. The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches vital significance to the full, unconditional and indiscriminate implementation of all provisions of the Convention. It reserves the right to withdraw from the Convention under the following circumstances:

• non-compliance with the principle of equal treatment of all States Parties in implementation of all relevant provisions of the Convention;

- disclosure of its confidential information contrary to the provisions of the Convention;

- imposition of restrictions incompatible with the obligations under the Convention.

3. As stipulated in article XI, exclusive and non-transparent regimesimpeding free international trade in chemicals and chemical technology for peaceful purposes should be disbanded. The Islamic Republic of Iran rejects any chemical export control mechanism not envisaged in the Convention.

4. The Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the sole international authority to determine the compliance of States Parties regarding chemical weapons. Accusations by States Parties against other States Parties in the absence of a determination of non-compliance by OPCW will seriously undermine the Convention and its repetition may make the Convention meaningless.

5. One of the objectives of the Convention as stipulated in its preamble is to «promote free trade in chemicals as well as international cooperation and exchange of scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention in order to enhance the economic and technological development of all States Parties.» This fundamental objective of the Convention should be respected and embraced by all States Parties to the Convention. Any form of undermining, either in words or in action, of this overriding objective is considered by the Islamic Republic of Iran a grave breach of the provisions of the Convention.

6. In line with the provisions of the Convention regarding non-discriminatory treatment of States Parties:

• inspection equipment should be commercially available to all States Parties without condition or limitation.
• the OPCW should maintain its international character by ensuring fair and balanced geographical distribution of the personnel of its Technical Secretariat, provision of assistance to and cooperation with States Parties, and equitable membership of States Parties in subsidiary organs of the Organization,

7. The implementation of the Convention should contribute to international peace and security and should not in any way diminish or harm national security or territorial integrity of the States Parties.»

Ireland

Declaration made upon signature and confirmed uponratification:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Italy

Declaration made upon signature and confirmed upon ratification:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Luxembourg

Declaration made upon signature and confirmed upon ratification:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Netherlands (Kingdom of the)

Upon signature:

Declaration:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Pakistan

Declaration:

«1. Pakistan has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all chemical weapons and their production facilities. The Convention constitutes an international legal framework for the realization of this goal. Pakistan, therefore, supports the objectives and purposes of the Convention.»

2. The objectives and purposes of the Convention must be strictly adhered to by all states. The relevant provisions on Challenge Inspections must not be abused to the detriment of the economic and security interests of the States Parties unrelated to chemical weapons. Otherwise, the universality and effectiveness of the Convention is bound to be jeopardized.

3. Abuse of the verification provisions of the Convention, for purposes unrelated to the Convention, will not be acceptable. Pakistan will never allow its sovereignty and national security to be compromised.

4. The Convention should effectively facilitate trade, scientific and technological exchanges and co-operation in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes. All export control regimes inconsistent with the Convention must be abolished.»

Portugal

Declaration made upon signature and confirmed upon ratification:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Spain

Declaration made upon signature and confirmed upon ratification:

[Same declaration, mutatis mutandis, as the one made by Belgium.]

Sudan

Declaration of understanding:

«Firstly, the unilateral application by a State Party to the Convention, runs counter to the objectives and purposes of the Convention.»

Secondly, the Convention must be fully and indiscriminately implemented particularly in the areas of inspection and transfer of technology for peaceful purposes.

Thirdly, no restrictions incompatible with the obligations under the Convention shall be imposed. Fourthly, the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), is the sole international authority to determine the compliance of States Parties with the provisions of the Convention.»

Syrian Arab Republic

Declarations:

...shall comply with the stipulations contained [in the Convention] and observe them faithfully and sincerely, applying the Convention provisionally pending its entry into force for the Syrian Arab Republic. [The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic] also affirms the following:

The accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Convention shall not in any sense imply recognition of Israel, and shall not entail entering into any relations with Israel in the matters governed by the provisions thereof.

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are fully entitled to extend the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and the British Antarctic Territory.

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have no doubts about the sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and the British Antarctic Territory, and their surrounding maritime areas, and reject the claim by the Government of Argentina to soverignty over those islands and areas and that the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are under illegal occupation by the United Kingdom.»