--- title: "<Статус Дополнительного протокола II к Договору о запрещении ядерного оружия в Латинской Америке (Договор Тлателолко) (Мехико, 14 февраля 1967 года)> [рус., англ.]" status: действует canonical: "https://bukva.ai/docs/status-dopolnitelnogo-protokola-ii-k-dogovoru-o" --- ## <Статус Дополнительного протокола II к Договору о запрещении ядерного оружия в Латинской Америке (Договор Тлателолко) (Мехико, 14 февраля 1967 года)> [рус., англ.] # <Статус Дополнительного протокола II к Договору о запрещении ядерного оружия в Латинской Америке (Договор Тлателолко) (Мехико, 14 февраля 1967 года)> [рус., англ.] [неофициальный перевод]
СТАТУС ДОПОЛНИТЕЛЬНОГО [ПРОТОКОЛА II](https://bukva.ai/docs/dogovor-i/statya-1-3#p100226)
К ДОГОВОРУ О ЗАПРЕЩЕНИИ ЯДЕРНОГО ОРУЖИЯ В ЛАТИНСКОЙ АМЕРИКЕ
(МЕХИКО, 14 ФЕВРАЛЯ 1967 ГОДА)
**(последние изменения произошли 8 января 1979 года)**
ГосударствоПодписаниеДепонированиеВид депонирования
Китай21.08.1973<*>12.06.1974Ратификация
Российская Федерация18.05.1978<*>08.01.1979<*>Ратификация
Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии20.12.1967<*>11.12.1969<*>Ратификация
Соединенные Штаты Америки01.04.1968<*>12.05.1971<*>Ратификация
Франция18.07.1973<*>22.03.1974<*>Ратификация
## ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN | Number of States Parties: | 5 | | --- | --- |
StateSignatureDepositDeposit Type
China21.08.1973<*>12.06.1974Ratification
France18.07.1973<*>22.03.1974<*>Ratification
Russian Federation18.05.1978<*>08.01.1979<*>Ratification
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland20.12.1967<*>11.12.1969<*>Ratification
United States of America01.04.1968<*>12.05.1971<*>Ratification
**<*> A note, statement, declaration, or reservation, is attached to the signature or depository action.** China With the following declaration: "The Latin American countries proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America with a view to countering the policy of nuclear threat and blackmamil pursued by the super Powers and safeguarding the peace and security of Latin America. The Chinese Government respects and supports this just position and, complying with the request of the United States of Mexico and other Latin American countries, has decided to sign Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in Mexico City on 21 August 1973. "The Chinese Government has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and maintained that, as the first step, all nuclear countries should first of all undertake not to use nuclear weapons, particularly not use them against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Chinese Government has repeatedly declared that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. On behalf of the Chinese Government, China's Minister for Foreign Affairs Chi Peng-fei gave a specific undertaking in regard to the nuclear-wepaon-free zone in Latin America on 14 November 1972. The Chinese Government will now reiterate this undertaking: China will never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone; nor willl China test, manufacture, produce, stockpile, install or deploy nuclear weapons in these countries or in this zone, or send her means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons to cross the territory, territorial sea or air space of Latin American countries. "It is necessary to point out that the signing of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America by the Chinese Government does not imply any change whatsoever in China's principled stand on the disarmament and nuclear weapons issue and, in particular, does not affect the Chinese Government's consistent stand against the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the partial nuclear test ban Treaty, which have been used by certain countries possessing huge numbers of nuclear weapons in an attempt to establish their nuclear monopoly, nuclear superiority and nuclear hegemony in the world. China is developing nuclear weapons solely because she is compelled to do so, and she is developing them entirely for defensive purposes as well as for breaking the nuclear monopoly and proceeding from there to the elimination of nuclear weapons. "What merits attention in the view of the Chinese Government is that, under the smokescreen of "detente" the super-Powers, which possess huge numbers of nuclear weapons, are now continuing to intensify their nuclear arms race and their contention for spheres of influence, thus gravely threatening the peace and security of non-nuclear countries and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Chinese Government holds that, in order that Latin America may truly become a nuclear-weapon-free zone, all nuclear countries, and particularly the super-Powers, which possess huge numbers of nuclear weapons, must first of all undertake earnestly not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American countries and the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone, and they must be asked to undertake to observe and implement the following: (1) dismantling of all foreign military bases in Latin America and refraining from establishing any new foreign military bases there; (2) prohibition of the passage of any means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons through Latin American territory, territorial sea or air space. **"The Chinese Government hopes that the Latin American countries will strengthen their solidarity and advance together in their struggle against the policy of nuclear threat and blackmail purused by the super-Powers and for the establishment of the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Chinese Government will continue to make unremitting efforts together with the Latin American countries and all other peace-loving countries for the attainment of the great, long-range objective of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons throughout the world."** France With declaration With the following declaration: "1- The French Government interprets the undertaking made in article 3 of the Protocol as being without prejudice to the full exercise of the right of self-defence confirmed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. "2- The French Government takes note of the interpretation of the Treaty given by the Preparatory Commission and reproduced in the Final Act, which states that the Treaty does not apply to transit, authorization or denial of which is within the exclusive competence of each State Party, in conformity with the relevant rules and principles of international law. "3- The French Government considers the reference to the application of legislation in article 3 of the Treaty to imply legislation which is in conformity with international law. "4- The provisions of articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol apply to the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as it existed at the time of the signature of the Protocol by the French Government. Accordingly, no amendment to the said Treaty that enters into force in conformity with the provisions of article 29 thereof can be regarded as binding on the French Government without that Government's express consent. "If the interpretive declaration thus made by the French Government is contested in whole or in part by one or more Contracting Parties to the Treaty or to Protocol II, the said instruments shall be without effect in relations between the French Republic and the contesting State or States." With the following declaration: **"The French Government is ready to consider that the undertakings which it assumed under Protocol II annexed to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America shall apply not only to the signatory States, but also to the territories for which the undertaking to apply the statute of denuclearization is in force, in accordance with Article 1 of Protocol I."** Russian Federation With declaration Membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the United Nations is continued as from 24 December 1991 by the Russian Federation. As from that date, the Russian Federation maintains full responsibility for all the rights and obligations of the USSR under the Charter of the United Nations. As from that date, the Russian Federation continues to exercise its rights and honour its commitments deriving from international treaties concluded by the USSR and performs the functions formerly performed by the Government of the USSR as depositary of international treaties. With the following declaration: "As a consistent supporter of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, and wishing to assist the efforts of the Latin American States to that end, the Soviet Government has taken the decision to sign Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). "In signing Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to state the following: "1. The Soviet Union proceeds from the principle that article 1 of the Treaty applies, as laid down in article 5 of the Treaty, to any nuclear explosive device and that, consequently, the carrying out by any party to the Treaty of explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes would constitute a violation of its obligations as defined in article 1, and would be incompatible with its non-nuclear status. A solution of the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes for States parties to the Treaty may be found in the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in the context of the international procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency. "2. In signing Additional Protocol II, the Soviet Union proceds from the premise that at the present time the zone of application of the Treaty includes the territories for which the Treaty is in force, as laid down in article 4, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. The signature by the Soviet Union of Additional Protocol II in no way signifies recognition of the possibility of application of the Treaty, as prescribed in article 4, paragraph 2, beyond the territories of States parties, including the air space and the territorial sea established in accordance with international law. "3. With regard to the reference in article 3 of the Treaty to "its own legislation" in connexion with the territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the States parties to the Treaty exercise sovereignty, the signature by the Soviet Union of Protocol II does not signify recognition of their claims to exercise sovereignty which infringe the generally accepted principles of international law. "4. The Soviet Union takes into consideration the interpretation of the Treaty included in the Final Act adopted by the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, whereby transport of nuclear weapons by the parties to the Treaty is covered by the prohibitions laid down in article 1 of the Treaty. "5. In the Final Act adopted by the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, the Treaty is interpreted to mean that the granting of permission for the transit of nuclear weapons at the request of States not parties to the Treaty falls within the competence of each individual State party to the Treaty. In that connexion the Soviet Union reaffirms its position to the effect that to grant permission for the transit of nuclear weapons in any form would violate the spirit of the Treaty which - as expressly stated in its preamble - is that Latin America should be wholly free from nuclear weapons; and would be incompatible with the non-nuclear status of States parties to the Treaty and with their obligations as defined in article 1 of the Treaty. "6. Any action taken by one or more States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that is incompatible with its non-nuclear status, and the commisison by one or more States parties to the Treaty of an act of aggression in support of a nuclear-weapon State or jointly with that State, will be considered by the Soviet Union as incompatible with the relevant obligations of those countries under the Treaty. In such cases the Soviet Union reserves the right to review its obligations under Additional Protocol II. "The Soviet Union also reserves the right to review its position with regard to Additional Protocol II in the event of any action on the part of other nuclear-weapon States that is incompatible with their obligations under the said Protocol. "7. The Soviet Government delcares that the provisions of the articles of Additional Protocol II are applicable to the text of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in the version in which it was formulated up to the time of signature of the Protocol by the Government of the USSR, taking into account the position of the Soviet Union set forth in this declaration. In that connexion, any amendment to that Treaty which enters into force in accordance with the provisions of articles 29 and 6 of the Treaty shall have no force in respect of the Soviet Union in the absence of clearly expressed agreement to that effect on the part of the USSR." The Secretariat was subsequently informed that the instrument of ratification was signed on 12 December 1978 and deposited on 8 January 1979, accompanied by the following statement: "The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that it has ratified the following document: "The Additional Protocol to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Moscow, on 18 May 1978, accompanied by a declaration made by the Government of the USSR when signing this Protocol, and by the following statement: "The Soviet Union affirms that the obligations accepted by it in accordance with Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco also extend to those territories to which denuclearized zone status applies, in accordance with Additional Protocol I of the Treaty. "Moreover, the Soviet Union reaffirms its position with respect to the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, in accordance with the United Nations Declaration on this question (General Assembly resolution 1415 (XV) of 14 December 1960." **United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland** With declaration In a note dated 19 May 1995 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico, the United Kingdom Government made the following comments on the Argentine Government's declaration upon deposit of its instrument of ratification on 18 January 1994: "The British Government is in no doubt about the United Kingdom's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, as well as over South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and therefore is also in no doubt about its right to extend the aforesaid Treaty to these territories. The British Government cannot but reject the unjustified claim of the Argentine Government that the islands form part of Argentine territory." With the following declaration: "... It is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that: "(a) the reference in Article 3 of the Treaty to "its own legislation" relates only to such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that signature or ratification of either Additional Protocol by the Government of the United Kingdom could not be regarded as implying recognition of any legislation which did not, in their view, comply with the relevant rules of international law; "(b) Article 18 of the Treaty, when read in conjunction with Articles 1 and 5 thereof, would not permit the Contracting Parties to the Treaty to carry out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes unless and until advances in technology have made possible the development of devices for such explosions which are not capable of being used for weapons purposes; "(c) signature or ratification of either Additional Protocol by the Government of the United Kingdom could not be regarded as affecting in any way the legal status of any territory for the international relations of which they are responsible lying within the limits of the geographical zone established by the Treaty; and "(d) the Government of the United Kingdom would, in the event of any act of aggression by a Contracting Party to the Treaty in which that Party was supported by a nuclear-weapon State, be free to reconsider the extent to which they could be regarded as committed by the provisions of Additional Protocol II. "... The Government of the United Kingdom are prepared to regard their undertaking under Article 3 of Additional Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties to the Treaty as extending not only to those Parties but also to territories in respect of which the undertaking to apply the statute of denuclearisation, in accordance with Article I of Additional Protocol I, becomes effective." With the following declaration: "In so far as concerns the Additional Protocol I, the ratification includes the Associated States of Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St.Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, and the territories of the Bahamas, British Honduras, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Montserrat and athe Turks and Caicos Islands. With the following declaration made upon deposit of the instruments of ratification by the representative of the United Kingdom: "On depositing these instruments of ratification, I have to declare that it is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom that: [same as "(a) to (d)" above] "I have the honour further to declare that the Government of the United Kingdom are prepared to regard their undertaking under Article 3 of Additional Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties to the Treaty as extending not only to those Parties but also to territories in respect of which the undertaking to apply the statute of denuclearisation, in accordance with Article I of Additional Protocol I, becomes effective. "The Government of the United Kingdom have always believed that the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin Ameica would be a most useful step towards nonproliferation and the building up of international confidence. While warmly welcoming the achievement of the States concerned in settting up the organs of the Treaty, Her Majesty's Government note with regret that the Treaty is not yet in force in a number of important States in the area. The Government of the United Kingdom therefore hope that the deposit of their instruments of ratification of the Additional Protocols to the Treaty will serve as an encouragement both to other nuclear-weapon-States to recognise the Treaty and to those Latin American States which have not yet done so, to bring the Treaty into force in their territory. **United States of America** With declaration 1. Subject to the following understandings: "(1) That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by the Additional Protocol do not affect the exclusive power and legal competence under international law of a State adhering to this Protocol to grant or deny transit and transport privileges to its own or any other vessels or aircraft irrespective of cargo or armaments. "(2) That the provisions of the Treaty made applicable by the Additional Protocol do not affect rights under international law of a State adhering to this Protocol regarding the exercise of the freedom of the seas, or regarding passage through or over waters subject to the sovereignty of a State. "(3) That the understandings and declarations attached by the United States to its ratification of Additional Protocol II (text attached) apply also to its ratification of Additional Protocol I." (See Note 2 below.) In a note dated 2 April 1982, the Government of the USSR expressed the following view in connection with the reservation made by the Government of the United States of America: "The Soviet side considers it necessary to emphasize that the transport of nuclear weapons is covered by the prohibitions provided for in article 1 of the Treaty and that permission of the transit of nuclear weapons in any form through the zone of application of the Treaty would be contrary to the purposes of the Treaty, according to which, as specifically stated in its preamble, Latin America must be wholly free from nuclear weapons, and would be inconsistent with the nuclear-free status of the States Parties to the Treaty and their obligations defined in article 1 thereof. "It is requested that the Government of Mexico, as depositary of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, should bring the above position of the Soviet Union to the attention of the States Parties to the Treaty and to its Additional Protocols I and II." 2- With the following declaration: "In signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States Government makes the following statement: "I "The United States understands that the Treaty and its Protocols have no effect upon the international status of territorial claims. "The United States takes note of the Preparatory Commisison's interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges. "As regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons agianst the Contracting Parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty. "II "The United States wishes to point out again the fact that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore, we understand the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is our understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18. "The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connexion, the United States reaffirms its willingness to make available nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes on a non-discriminatory basis under appropriate international arrangements and to join other nuclear-weapon States in a commitment to do so. "III "The United States also wishes to state that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties." 3- With the following understanding: "I "That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purpose of this treaty and its protocols, or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law. "That the United States takes note of the Preparatory Commisison's interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges. "That, as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons agianst the Contracting Parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the Treaty. "II "That the United States Government considers that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore the United States Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It also understands that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the contracting parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18. "That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive device. "III "That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties." ---