Статус Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (Москва, Вашингтон, Лондон, 1 июля 1968 года) [рус., англ.]
Актуально на 08.11.2026.
Как цитировать: <Статус Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (Москва, Вашингтон, Лондон, 1 июля 1968 года)> [рус., англ.]. https://bukva.ai/docs/status-dogovora-o-nerasprostranenii-yadernogo
СТАТУС ДОГОВОРА О НЕРАСПРОСТРАНЕНИИ ЯДЕРНОГО ОРУЖИЯ (МОСКВА, ВАШИНГТОН, ЛОНДОН, 1 ИЮЛЯ 1968 ГОДА)
(последние изменения произошли 12 февраля 2015 года)
| Государство | Подписание | Депонирование | Вид депонирования | ||||
| Австралия | 27.02.1970 27.02.1970 27.02.1970 | <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 23.01.1973 23.01.1973 23.01.1973 | <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация |
| Австрия | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 27.06.1969 27.06.1969 28.06.1969 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Азербайджан | 22.09.1992 | Москва | Присоединение | ||||
| Албания | 12.09.1990 14.09.1990 28.09.1990 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Алжир | 12.01.1995 12.01.1995 12.01.1995 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Ангола | 14.10.1996 30.04.2010 | Вашингтон Москва | Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Андорра | 07.06.1986 25.06.1996 02.07.1996 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Антигуа и Барбуда | 17.06.1985 | Лондон | Правопреемство | ||||
| Аргентина | 10.02.1995 17.02.1995 | <*> | Вашингтон Лондон | Присоединение Присоединение | |||
| Армения | 21.06.1993 15.07.1993 | Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Афганистан | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 04.02.1970 05.02.1970 05.03.1970 | Вашингтон Москва Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Багамские Острова | 11.08.1976 13.08.1976 30.08.1976 | <*> <*> <*> | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Правопреемство Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Бангладеш | 31.08.1979 31.08.1979 27.09.1979 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Барбадос | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 21.02.1980 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Бахрейн | 03.11.1988 | <*> | Вашингтон | Присоединение | |||
| Беларусь | 09.02.1993 22.07.1993 23.07.1993 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Белиз | 09.08.1985 | Лондон | Правопреемство | ||||
| Бельгия | 20.08.1968 20.08.1968 20.08.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 02.05.1975 02.05.1975 04.05.1975 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Бенин | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 31.10.1972 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Болгария | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.09.1969 18.09.1969 03.11.1969 | Вашингтон Москва Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Боливия (Многонациональное государство) | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 26.05.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Босния и Герцеговина | 15.08.1994 | <*> | Вашингтон | Правопреемство | |||
| Ботсвана | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 28.04.1969 | Лондон | Ратификация | ||
| Бразилия | 18.09.1998 18.09.1998 18.09.1998 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | |||
| Бруней-Даруссалам | 26.03.1985 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Буркина-Фасо | 25.11.1968 11.08.1969 | Вашингтон Москва | 03.03.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Бурунди | 19.03.1971 | Москва | Присоединение | ||||
| Бутан | 23.05.1985 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Вануату | 24.08.1995 | Лондон | Присоединение | ||||
| Венгрия | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 27.05.1969 27.05.1969 27.05.1969 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | |
| Венесуэла (Боливарианская Республика) | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 25.09.1975 26.09.1975 03.10.1975 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Вьетнам | 14.06.1982 | <*> | Москва | Присоединение | |||
| Габон | 19.02.1974 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Гайана | 19.10.1993 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Гаити | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 02.06.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Гамбия | 04.09.1968 20.09.1968 24.09.1968 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | 12.05.1975 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Гана | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 24.07.1968 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | 04.05.1970 05.05.1970 11.05.1970 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Гватемала | 26.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 22.09.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Гвинея | 29.04.1985 | Москва | Присоединение | ||||
| Гвинея-Бисау | 20.08.1976 | Москва | Присоединение | ||||
| Германия | 28.11.1969 28.11.1969 28.11.1969 | <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 02.05.1975 02.05.1975 | <*> <*> | Лондон Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация |
| Гондурас | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 16.05.1973 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Государство Палестина | 10.02.2015 12.02.2015 | Москва Лондон | Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Гренада | 02.09.1975 03.12.1975 | <*> <*> | Лондон Вашингтон | Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Греция | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Москва Вашингтон | 11.03.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Грузия | 07.03.1994 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Дания | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 03.01.1969 03.01.1969 03.01.1969 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Демократическая Республика Конго | 22.07.1968 17.09.1968 | Вашингтон Лондон | 04.08.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Джибути | 16.10.1996 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Доминика | 10.08.1984 | Лондон | Правопреемство | ||||
| Доминиканская Республика | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 24.07.1971 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Египет | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва | 26.02.1981 | <*> | Лондон | Ратификация | |
| Замбия | 15.05.1991 22.05.1991 05.07.1991 | Вашингтон Лондон Москва | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Зимбабве | 26.09.1991 26.09.1991 04.10.1991 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Индонезия | 02.03.1970 02.03.1970 02.03.1970 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 12.07.1979 12.07.1979 12.07.1979 | <*> <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация |
| Иордания | 10.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 11.02.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Ирак | 01.07.1968 | Москва | 29.10.1969 | Москва | Ратификация | ||
| Иран (Исламская Республика) | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 02.02.1970 10.02.1970 05.03.1970 | Вашингтон Москва Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Ирландия | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 04.07.1968 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | 01.07.1968 02.07.1968 04.07.1968 | Вашингтон Москва Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Исландия | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 18.07.1969 18.07.1969 18.07.1969 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Испания | 05.11.1987 05.11.1987 05.11.1987 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Италия | 28.01.1969 28.01.1969 28.01.1969 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 02.05.1975 02.05.1975 04.05.1975 | <*> | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация |
| Йемен | 23.09.1968 | Москва | 14.05.1986 26.01.1989 | Лондон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Кабо-Верде | 24.10.1979 | Москва | Присоединение | ||||
| Казахстан | 14.02.1994 21.03.1994 20.05.1994 | Вашингтон Лондон Москва | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Камбоджа | 02.06.1972 25.09.1987 | Вашингтон Москва | Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Камерун | 17.07.1968 18.07.1968 | Вашингтон Москва | 08.01.1969 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Канада | 23.07.1968 23.07.1968 29.07.1968 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | 08.01.1969 08.01.1969 08.01.1969 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Катар | 03.04.1989 10.05.1989 13.06.1989 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Кения | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 11.06.1970 | Москва | Ратификация | ||
| Кипр | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 10.02.1970 16.02.1970 05.03.1970 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Кирибати | 18.04.1975 | Лондон | Правопреемство | ||||
| Китай | 09.03.1992 12.03.1992 17.03.1992 | <*> <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | |||
| Колумбия | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 08.04.1986 29.04.1986 30.04.1986 | Вашингтон Москва Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Коморские Острова | 04.10.1995 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Конго | 26.07.1968 | Москва | 23.10.1978 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Корейская Народно-Демократическая Республика | 12.12.1985 | <*> | Москва | Присоединение | |||
| Коста-Рика | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 03.03.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Кот-д'Ивуар | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 06.03.1973 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Куба | 04.11.2002 | <*> | Москва | Присоединение | |||
| Кувейт | 15.08.1968 15.08.1968 22.08.1968 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | 17.11.1989 | <*> | Вашингтон | Ратификация | |
| Кыргызстан | 05.07.1994 | Москва | Присоединение | ||||
| Лаосская Народно-Демократическая Республика | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 20.02.1970 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 | Москва Лондон Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Латвия | 31.01.1992 | Лондон | Присоединение | ||||
| Лесото | 09.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 20.05.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Либерия | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 05.03.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Ливан | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 15.07.1970 15.07.1970 20.11.1970 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Ливия | 18.07.1968 19.07.1968 23.07.1968 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | 26.05.1975 26.05.1975 26.05.1975 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Литва | 23.09.1991 23.09.1991 | Лондон Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Лихтенштейн | 20.04.1978 20.04.1978 20.04.1978 | <*> <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | |||
| Люксембург | 14.08.1968 14.08.1968 14.08.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 02.05.1975 02.05.1975 04.05.1975 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Маврикий | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 08.04.1969 14.04.1969 25.04.1969 | Вашингтон Лондон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Мавритания | 26.10.1993 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Мадагаскар | 22.08.1968 | Вашингтон | 08.10.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Малави | 18.02.1986 19.02.1986 04.03.1986 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Малайзия | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Мали | 14.07.1969 15.07.1969 | Вашингтон Москва | 10.02.1970 05.03.1970 | Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Мальдивы | 11.09.1968 | Вашингтон | 07.04.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Мальта | 17.04.1969 | Вашингтон | 06.02.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Марокко | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 27.11.1970 30.11.1970 16.12.1970 | Москва Лондон Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Маршалловы Острова | 30.01.1995 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Мексика | 26.07.1968 26.07.1968 26.07.1968 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 21.01.1969 21.01.1969 21.01.1969 | <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация |
| Микронезия (Федеративные Штаты) | 14.04.1995 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Мозамбик | 04.09.1990 12.09.1990 20.09.1990 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Монако | 13.03.1995 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Монголия | 01.07.1968 | Москва | 14.05.1969 | <*> | Москва | Ратификация | |
| Мьянма | 02.12.1992 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Намибия | 02.10.1992 07.10.1992 09.10.1992 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Науру | 07.06.1982 | Лондон | Присоединение | ||||
| Непал | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.01.1970 09.01.1970 03.02.1970 | Вашингтон Москва Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Нигер | 09.10.1992 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Нигерия | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 27.09.1968 07.10.1968 14.10.1968 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Нидерланды | 20.08.1968 20.08.1968 20.08.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 02.05.1975 02.05.1975 02.05.1975 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | |
| Никарагуа | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Вашингтон | 06.03.1973 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Новая Зеландия | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 10.09.1969 10.09.1969 10.09.1969 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Норвегия | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.02.1969 05.02.1969 05.02.1969 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Объединенная Республика Танзания | 31.05.1991 07.06.1991 18.06.1991 | <*> | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | |||
| Объединенные Арабские Эмираты | 26.09.1995 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Оман | 23.01.1997 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Палау | 14.04.1995 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Панама | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 13.01.1977 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Папуа-Новая Гвинея | 13.01.1982 25.01.1982 16.02.1982 | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Парагвай | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 04.02.1970 05.03.1970 | Вашингтон Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Перу | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 03.03.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Польша | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 12.06.1969 12.06.1969 12.06.1969 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Португалия | 15.12.1977 15.12.1977 15.12.1977 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Республика Корея | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 23.04.1975 | <*> | Вашингтон | Ратификация | |
| Республика Молдова | 11.10.1994 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Российская Федерация | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | |
| Руанда | 20.05.1975 20.05.1975 20.05.1975 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Румыния | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 04.02.1970 04.02.1970 04.02.1970 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Сальвадор | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 11.07.1972 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Самоа | 17.03.1975 18.03.1975 26.03.1975 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Сан-Марино | 01.07.1968 29.07.1968 21.11.1968 | Вашингтон Лондон Москва | 10.08.1970 20.08.1970 31.08.1970 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | |
| Сан-Томе и Принсипи | 20.07.1983 | Москва | Присоединение | ||||
| Саудовская Аравия | 03.10.1988 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Святейший Престол | 25.02.1971 25.02.1971 25.02.1971 | <*> <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | |||
| Северная Македония | 30.03.1995 12.04.1995 | <*> <*> | Лондон Вашингтон | Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Сейшельские Острова | 12.03.1985 14.03.1985 08.04.1985 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Сенегал | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 26.07.1968 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | 17.12.1970 22.12.1970 15.01.1971 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Сент-Винсент и Гренадины | 06.11.1984 | Лондон | Правопреемство | ||||
| Сент-Китс и Невис | 22.03.1993 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Сент-Люсия | 28.12.1979 | Лондон | Правопреемство | ||||
| Сербия | 27.04.1992 05.09.2001 03.06.2006 | <*> <*> | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | Правопреемство Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Сингапур | 05.02.1970 05.02.1970 05.02.1970 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 10.03.1976 10.03.1976 10.03.1976 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Сирийская Арабская Республика | 01.07.1968 | Москва | 24.09.1969 | <*> | Москва | Ратификация | |
| Словакия | 01.01.1993 01.01.1993 17.04.1993 | <*> <*> <*> | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | Правопреемство Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Словения | 07.04.1992 20.08.1992 | <*> | Лондон Вашингтон | Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 27.11.1968 27.11.1968 29.11.1968 | <*> <*> <*> | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация |
| Соединенные Штаты Америки | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Соломоновы Острова | 17.06.1981 | Лондон | Правопреемство | ||||
| Сомали | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.03.1970 12.11.1970 | Лондон Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Судан | 24.12.1968 | Москва | 31.10.1973 22.11.1973 10.12.1973 | <*> | Вашингтон Москва Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | |
| Суринам | 30.06.1976 | <*> | Вашингтон | Правопреемство | |||
| Сьерра-Леоне | 26.02.1975 26.02.1975 26.02.1975 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Таджикистан | 17.01.1995 | Москва | Присоединение | ||||
| Таиланд | 07.12.1972 | Лондон | Присоединение | ||||
| Тимор-Лешти | 05.05.2003 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Того | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 27.02.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Тонга | 07.07.1971 15.07.1971 24.08.1971 | <*> <*> <*> | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Правопреемство Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Тринидад и Тобаго | 20.08.1968 22.08.1968 | Вашингтон Лондон | 30.10.1986 30.10.1986 | Лондон Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Тувалу | 19.01.1979 | Лондон | Правопреемство | ||||
| Тунис | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 26.02.1970 26.02.1970 26.02.1970 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Туркменистан | 29.09.1994 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Турция | 28.01.1969 28.01.1969 28.01.1969 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 17.04.1980 17.04.1980 17.04.1980 | <*> <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | |
| Уганда | 20.10.1982 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Узбекистан | 07.05.1992 | Москва | Присоединение | ||||
| Украина | 05.12.1994 05.12.1994 05.12.1994 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | |||
| Уругвай | 01.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 31.08.1970 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Фиджи | 21.07.1972 14.08.1972 29.08.1972 | <*> <*> | Вашингтон Лондон Москва | Присоединение Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Филиппины | 01.07.1968 18.07.1968 | Вашингтон Москва | 05.10.1972 16.10.1972 20.10.1972 | Вашингтон Лондон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Финляндия | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.02.1969 05.02.1969 05.02.1970 | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Франция | 02.08.1992 03.08.1992 03.08.1992 | Москва Лондон Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Хорватия | 29.06.1992 | <*> | Вашингтон | Правопреемство | |||
| Центральноафриканская Республика | 25.10.1970 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Чад | 01.07.1968 | Москва | 10.03.1971 11.03.1971 23.03.1971 | <*> | Вашингтон Москва Лондон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | |
| Черногория | 03.06.2006 12.12.2006 | <*> <*> | Москва Лондон | Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Чешская Республика | 01.01.1993 01.01.1993 05.04.1993 | <*> <*> <*> | Москва Вашингтон Лондон | Правопреемство Правопреемство Правопреемство | |||
| Чили | 25.05.1995 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Швейцария | 27.11.1969 27.11.1969 27.11.1969 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 09.03.1977 09.03.1977 09.03.1977 | <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация |
| Швеция | 19.08.1968 19.08.1968 19.08.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 09.01.1970 09.01.1970 09.01.1970 | <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | |
| Шри-Ланка | 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 01.07.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.03.1979 05.03.1979 05.03.1979 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Эквадор | 09.07.1968 | Вашингтон | 07.03.1969 | Вашингтон | Ратификация | ||
| Экваториальная Гвинея | 01.11.1984 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Эритрея | 16.03.1995 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Эсватини | 24.06.1969 | Лондон | 11.12.1969 16.12.1969 12.01.1970 | <*> | Лондон Вашингтон Москва | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | |
| Эстония | 07.01.1992 31.01.1992 | Лондон Вашингтон | Присоединение Присоединение | ||||
| Эфиопия | 05.09.1968 05.09.1968 05.09.1968 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.02.1970 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 | Москва Лондон Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Южная Африка | 10.07.1991 | Вашингтон | Присоединение | ||||
| Ямайка | 14.04.1969 14.04.1969 14.04.1969 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 05.03.1970 | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация | ||
| Япония | 03.02.1970 03.02.1970 03.02.1970 | <*> <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | 08.06.1976 08.06.1976 08.06.1976 | <*> <*> | Лондон Москва Вашингтон | Ратификация Ратификация Ратификация |
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
<*> A note, statement, declaration, or reservation, is attached to the signature or depository action.
The Argentine instrument of accession contains declarations, an unofficial translation of which reads as follows:
«1. Argentina firmly supports the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, thereby resolving the problem of assymetry or imbalance existing with regard to non-nuclear weapons countries that have renounced the possession thereof.»
«2. The provisions of the NPT, which shall be the subject of a Review and Extension Conference in April 1995, must not be interpreted as impeding present cooperation between Argentina and the organs of the United Nations or the OAS, or with other UN member States signatories to the Full Safeguards Accords in effect with the IAEA, in a series of exclusively peaceful nuclear activities also fully subject to the IAEA system of international safeguards.»
«3. Similarly, Argentina's bilateral or multilateral cooperation with other Latin American States of the region must not be affected with respect to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy carried out in accordance with the obligations assumed under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Tlatelolco Treaty) and with the provisions of the NPT, it being understood that these two agreements are instruments that include the promotion of the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy.»
«The Government of Australia:»
Supports effective international measures to counter the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In April 1968 when the Treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons was introduced in the United Nations General Assembly, Australia supported the resolution commending the Treaty for the consideration of Governments. Is conscious of the fact that in the long run the security of the world as a whole will depend upon effective measures to control the nuclear arms race and to bring about general and complete disarmament. The Government therefore welcomes the call in Article VI of the Treaty for negotiations to achieve these ends.
Hopes that the Treaty will be effective in its operation and will lead to improved relationships and enhanced co-operation between the nations of the world, and in particular between the nations of the Asian and Pacific region.
Believes that a condition of an effective Treaty is that it should attract a necessary degree of support. Some progress in this direction has been made but the Government will nevertheless want to be assured that there is a sufficient degree of support for the Treaty.
Regards it as essential that the Treaty should not affect continuing security commitments under existing treaties of mutual security. Attaches weight to the statements by the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union declaring their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide help to any non-nuclear weapons state party to the Treaty that is subject to aggression or the threat of aggression with nuclear weapons. At the same time the Government reaffirms its adherence to the principle, contained in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, of the right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Notes that Article 10 of the Treaty provides that any party has the right to withdraw in circumstances that jeopardised its supreme interests.
Notes that the Treaty will in no way inhibit and is in fact designed to assist non-nuclear weapon states in their research, development and use of nuclear energy and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes either individually or collectively; nor must it discriminate against any state or states in their peaceful pursuits in nuclear activities.
Considers that the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Australia with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Treaty Article III must in no way subject Australia to treatment less favourable than is accorded to other states which, individually or collectively, conclude safeguards agreements with that agency.
Considers it essential that the inspection and safeguards arrangements should not burden research, development, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; that they should not constitute an obstacle to a nation's economic development, commercial interests and trade; and that they should be effective in ensuring that any breaches of the Treaty would be detected.
Attaches importance to a review of the IAEA safeguards system and procedures to clarify those issues of importance to Australia. Welcomes the fact that the Treaty in Articles 4 and 5 provides for international co-operation for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions; notes the assurances that under the Treaty the supply of knowledge, materials and equipment would not be denied to any party; and considers it important that no nuclear development should be prohibited except when such activities would have no other purpose than the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Will co-operate closely with other governments in seeking clarifications and understandings in relation to those matters which must be resolved before Australia could proceed to ratification, being convinced that a Treaty which was truly effective in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons would be a major contribution to the security of the world as a whole.»
By a Note of 29 August 1985 the Government of Australia stated that the above Declaration no longer accurately reflected Australia's position: the said Declaration was not intended to have any further application after Australia's ratification of the Treaty on 23 January 1973.
Правительство Австралии было бы признательно, если бы это заявление больше не публиковалось и не распространялось как выражение позиции Австралии применительно к Договору, так как отдельные части этого заявления больше не являются точным отражением позиции Австралии. Нота № 3887 от 29 августа 1985 года получена 2 ЕД.
At the time of its signature of the Treaty at Washington, Australia made a declaration which was not intended to have any further application after Australia's ratification of the Treaty on January 23, 1973.
In a Note dated 16 July 1976, and received by the Government of the United Kingdom on 11 August 1976, the Government of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas declared that it considers itself bound by the Treaty.
The Embassy of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas transmitted to the Department of State, by note dated August 13, 1976, a note of the Minister of External Affairs of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas, dated July 16, 1976, stating that the Government of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas has examined the Treaty and «declares that it considers itself bound thereby by virtue of the signature of the United Kingdom and pursuant to customary international law. I would therefore request you to consider listing The Commonwealth of The Bahamas as a party to these instruments.»
The final provisions of the instrument of accession to the Treaty by Bahrain read as follows: «The accession by the State of Bahrain to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968, shall in no way constitute recognition of Israel or be a cause for the establishment of any relations of any kind therewith.»
Date of receipt of notification of succession by Bosnia and Herzegovina. The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Treaty on July 10, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification, with a declaration, on March 4, 1970.
Also deposited in Moscow and Washington on 18 September 1998
Chad signed the Treaty at Moscow on July 1, 1968.
Ceased to apply to Hong Kong wef 1 July 1997. Applies to Hong Kong (SAR) wef 1 July 1997.
«1. Китай проводит независимую самостоятельную мирную внешнюю политику, неизменно выступает за полное запрещение и окончательную ликвидацию ядерного оружия. Желая содействовать достижению этой цели, стремясь к защите международного мира, безопасности и стабильности, учитывая желания и требования большого числа безъядерных государств, Китай решил присоединиться к Договору.»
2. Китай проводит политику, направленную против распространения, поощрения ядерных вооружений и не занимается их распространением, а также не оказывает помощи другим странам в развитии ядерных вооружений. Китай поддерживает цели, предусмотренные в Договоре: предотвращение распространения ядерных вооружений, продвижение вперед дела сокращения ядерных вооружений, содействие международному сотрудничеству в области мирного использования ядерной энергии, и считает вышеуказанные три цели взаимосвязанными.
3. Китай считает, что предотвращение распространения ядерного оружия само по себе не является целью, а есть одна из мер и шагов в процессе осуществления полного запрещения и окончательной ликвидации ядерных вооружений. Предотвращение распространения ядерного оружия и сокращение ядерных вооружений должны воздействовать друг на друга: лишь только значительный прогресс в области сокращения ядерных вооружений послужит самым эффективным путем к предотвращению их распространения, реально укрепит авторитет системы нераспространения ядерного оружия. В то же время сохранение эффективной системы нераспространения ядерных вооружений благоприятствует осуществлению их полной ликвидации. В интересах этой благородной цели полного запрещения и окончательной ликвидации ядерных вооружений государства, обладающие наибольшими ядерными арсеналами, должны надлежащим образом выполнять свои особые обязательства, первыми пойти на прекращение испытаний, производства и размещения ядерных вооружений, на значительные сокращения ядерных вооружений всех видов, дислоцированных внутри страны и за рубежом. Практический прогресс, достигнутый этими государствами во всех этих областях, создаст предпосылки для созыва широкого представительного международного совещания по сокращению ядерных вооружений с участием всех ядерных государств.
4. В целях улучшения и усиления системы нераспространения ядерных вооружений, а также ускорения процесса полного запрещения и окончательной ликвидации ядерных вооружений Китай выступает за принятие следующих конкретных мер:
-
Все государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, должны взять на себя обязательство никогда и ни при каких обстоятельствах не применять первыми ядерного оружия, в этих целях заключить международное соглашение о неприменении первыми ядерного оружия.
-
Все государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, должны взять на себя обязательство не применять ядерного оружия и не прибегать к угрозе его применения в отношении безъядерных государств и безъядерных зон, для чего заключить международный правовой акт о неприменении ядерного оружия и угрозы его применения в отношении безъядерных государств и безъядерных зон.
-
Все государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, обязуются поддерживать предложения о создании безъядерных зон, уважать статус безъядерных зон и нести соответствующие обязательства.
-
Все государства, располагающие вне пределов своих стран ядерными вооружениями, должны полностью отвести их в пределы своих стран.
-
Космические державы должны прекратить гонку вооружений в космосе, развитие космических вооружений, особенно тех, которые связаны с ядерным оружием.
-
Подписание и ратификация этого договора тайваньскими властями от имени Китая соответственно 1-го июля 1968 года и 27-го января 1970 года являются незаконными и недействительными».
On July 1, 1968, the Treaty was signed at Washington in the name of the Republic of China. An instrument of ratification of the Treaty on behalf of the Republic of China was deposited at Washington on January 27, 1970. Effective January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. The authorities on Taiwan state that they will continue to abide by the provisions of the Treaty and the United States regards them as bound by its obligations.
The instrument of accession to the Treaty by the People's Republic of China contains statements, a translation of which reads as follows:
«I have the honor to inform you that the People's Republic of China, in accordance with the decision made by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on 29 December 1991, hereby accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred to as the Treaty) which was opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968, and to state as follows:»
«1. Pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace, China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. With a view to bringing about this objective and maintaining international peace, security and stability, and taking into consideration the aspirations and demands of the large numbers of non-nuclear-weapon countries, China has decided to accede to the Treaty.»
«2. China pursues a policy of not advocating, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nor helping other countries to develop nuclear weapons. China supports the objectives set forth in the Treaty, namely, prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, acceleration of nuclear disarmament and promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and believes that these three objectives are interrelated.»
«3. China maintains that the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons is not an end in itself, but a measure and step in the process towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament should be mutually complementary. Only when substantial progress is made in the field of nuclear disarmament can the proliferation of nuclear weapons be checked most effectively and the authority of the nuclear non-proliferation regime truly enhanced. At the same time, an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime is conducive to the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons. To attain the lofty goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should earnestly fulfill their special obligations by taking the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and drastically reducing those weapons of all kinds they have deployed inside and outside their countries. Tangible progress they make in all these aspects will create conditions for the convening of a widely representative international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon states.»
«4. China maintains that in order to improve and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and help attain the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the following specific measures should also be taken:»
(1) All nuclear-weapon states undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and an international agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons should be concluded.
(2) All nuclear-weapon states undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries or nuclear-free zones, and an international legal instrument on the non-use or non-threat of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries and nuclear-free zones should be concluded.
(3) All nuclear-weapon states undertake to support the proposition of establishing nuclear weapon-free zones, respect the status of such zones and undertake corresponding obligations.
(4) All states that have nuclear weapons deployed outside their boundaries withdraw all those weapons back to their own territories.
(5) The major space powers halt their arms race in outer space and cease the development of space weapons, the nuclear-related in particular.
«5. The signing and ratification of the Treaty by the Taiwan authorities in the name of China on 1 July 1968 and 27 January 1970 respectively are illegal and null and void.»
Date of the notification of succession by Croatia. The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Treaty on July 10, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification, with a declaration, on March 4, 1970.
«Правительство Республики Куба присоединяется к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО), проявляя при этом политическую волю и демонстрируя обязательство Кубинского Государства в продвижении, укреплении и консолидации многосторонности и международных договоров в области разоружения, способствуя усилиям международного сообщества, направленным на благо укрепления мира, безопасности во всем мире, несмотря на то, что самая мощная ядерная держава сохраняет политику враждебности в отношении Кубы, не исключающей использование вооруженной силы.»
Присоединяясь к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия, Правительство Республики Куба вновь подтверждает свою привязанность и уважение принципу нераспространения ядерного оружия в глобальном контексте. Следует отметить, однако, что для Кубы применение мер в этой области не является целью как таковой, а лишь шагом на пути к процессу, направленному на полную ликвидацию ядерного оружия и достижение всеобщего полного разоружения при соблюдении строгого и действенного международного контроля.
Правительство Кубы вновь заявляет о том, что оно не удовлетворено отсутствием конкретного продвижения в выполнении Статьи VI Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, обязывающей Договаривающие Стороны провести «добросовестные переговоры по действенным мерам, касающимся прекращения гонки ядерного вооружения в ближайшее время и ядерного разоружения, и по договору о всеобщем и полном разоружении при соблюдении строгого и действенного международного контроля». Куба считает, что Государства, располагающие ядерным оружием, несут в первую очередь ответственность за выполнение этой Статьи.
Для Кубы, военные доктрины, в основе которых лежит владение ядерным оружием, являются неприемлемыми и не выдерживающими никакой критики. Ни отдельно взятой стране, ни группе стран нельзя разрешить иметь монополию на ядерное вооружение. Более того, нельзя узаконить продолжающееся в количественном и качественном отношении развитие ядерного оружия исключительно теми клубными ядерными державами, которые признает Договор. Единственной формой преодоления недостатков, порожденных Договором о нераспространении ядерного оружия, а также его избирательной и дискриминационной сущности, является выполнение цели по полной ликвидации ядерного оружия, что обеспечит безопасность в равной степени для всех.
В рамках выполнения Статьи IV Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, Правительство Республики Куба считает необходимым прекращение навязывания ограничительных односторонних мер при обмене оборудованием, материалами и научной и технологической информацией для использования в мирных целях атомной энергии, которые противоречат законному праву Государств иметь полный доступ к использованию атомной энергии в мирных целях.
Присоединяясь к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия, Правительство Республики Куба заявляет о том, что в настоящий момент на ее территории, в провинции Гуантанамо, находится морская база Соединенных Штатов. В отношении этой части кубинской территории Кубинское Государство не осуществляет надлежащей ему юрисдикции, ввиду незаконной ее оккупации Соединенными Штатами. Следовательно, Правительство Республики Куба не несет никакой ответственности по Договору в отношении указанной территории, так как неизвестно о размещении, наличии, сохранении или намерениях Соединенных Штатов о размещении ядерных средств, включая ядерное оружие, на этой незаконно окулированной кубинской территории».
Notification of succession by the Czech Republic to the Treaty received on January 1, 1993 and effective on that date; the former Czechoslovakia signed the Treaty on July 1, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification on July 22, 1969. On December 31, 1992, at midnight, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist and was succeeded by two separate and independent states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
In a Note dated 24 March 1993, received on 5 April 1993 the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Czech Republic notified the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the following: «Upon the instruction of the Government of the Czech Republic and referring to the Declaration of the Czech National Council to All Parliaments and Nations of the World of 17 December 1992, I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency the following:»
In conformity with the valid principles of international law and to the extent defined by it, the Czech Republic, as a successor State to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, considers itself bound, as of 1 January 1993, i.e. the date of the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, by multilateral international treaties to which the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was a party on that date, including reservations and declarations to their provisions made earlier by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
From among the treaties deposited with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland this applies also to the following:
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at London, Washington and Moscow on 1 July 1968.»
Democratic People's Republic of Korea
On 10 January 2003, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its withdrawal from the Treaty in a public statement. States parties to the Treaty continue to express divergent views regarding the status of the DPRK under the NPT.
(Translation): Convinced that the proliferation of nuclear weapons which threatens the security of mankind must be curbed, Egypt signed and then ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Egypt was among the first countries which called for the rapid conclusion of this Treaty, and played a constructive role in the negotiations preceding its conclusion as a complement to earlier efforts which had successfully culminated in the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.
Egypt's commitment by virtue of the provisions of the the Non-Proliferation Treaty to refrain, in any way, from acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons shall not impair its inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty, which affirms the inalienable right of all the parties of the Treaty to develop research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The stipulation of that right in the Treaty itself is, in fact, a codification of a basic human right, which can neither be waived or impaired.
From this premise, Egypt also views with special attention the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty calling on the Parties of the Treaty who are in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Embarking on a number of construction projects of nuclear power reactors to generate electricity in order to meet its increasing energy needs so as to promote the prosperity and welfare of its people, Egypt expects from industrialized nations with a developed nuclear industry a wholehearted assistance and support. This would be in consonance with the letter and spirit of Article IV of the Treaty, in particular since Egypt has committed itself to the application of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency as regard the peaceful nuclear activities carried out within its territory, in accordance with the provisions of Article III of the Treaty.
Within the framework of the rights provided for in the Treaty for all Parties thereto in as far as the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is concerned, Egypt wishes to refer to the provisions of Article V of the Treaty, which state that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to this Treaty. Though such applications pose presently certain difficulties, particularly in view of their detrimental environmental effect, Egypt nevertheless deems that this should not relieve the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty from their responsibility to promote research and development of these applications, in order to overcome all the difficulties presently involved therein.
Egypt wishes to express its strong dissatisfaction at the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two super-Powers, because of their failure to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Although it welcomes the 1972 and 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, known as SALT I and SALT II, Egypt cannot but admit that the Treaties have failed to bring about an effective cessation of the nuclear arms race, quantitatively and qualitatively, and have even permitted the development of a new generation of weapons of mass destruction.
Moreover, in spite of the fact that more than 17 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the nuclear-weapons states are alleging that various difficulties still stand in the way of a permanent ban on all nuclear weapons tests, when there is only need for a political will to achieve that end.
Consequently, Egypt avails itself of this opportunity, namely the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to appeal to the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligation whereby the nuclear arms race will be stopped and nuclear disarmament achieved. Egypt also calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to exert all possible efforts so as to achieve a permanent ban of all nuclear weapon tests at an early date. This will bring to an end the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, in as much as the cut off of fissionable material for military purposes will curb the quantative increase of nuclear weapons.
As regards the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, Egypt deems that Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 does not provide non-nuclear-weapon States with a genuine guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. Egypt, therefore, appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to exert their effort with a view to concluding an agreement prohibiting once and for all the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against any State.
The undertaking of these steps is consistent with the letter and spirit of the basic guiding principles formulated by the General Assembly of the United Nations for the conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty, in particular the principle of balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, and stipulating that the Treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament.
Convinced that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world shall be instrumental in enabling the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve its objectives and aims, Egypt has exerted great efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as in Africa.
In this report, Egypt expresses its great satisfaction with the United Nations General Assembly resolution adopted by consensus at its 35th session inviting the countries of the Middle East, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, to declare solemnly their support for the achievement of this objective, that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or possessing nuclear weapons, and to deposit their declarations of the United Nations Security Council.
In conclusion, Egypt wishes to point out that it has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons out of strong belief that this step complies with its supreme national interests, provided the Treaty succeeds in curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world, particularly in the Middle East, which should remain completely free of nuclear weapons if it is to contribute constructively to peace, security and prosperity for its people and the world at large.
In a Note dated 14 July 1972, and received by the Government of the United Kingdom on 14 August, 1972, the Government of Fiji declared that it considers itself bound by the Treaty.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, on the occasion of and in formal conjunction with its signature today of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has the honour to expound to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland the following understandings on which it signs the Treaty. The Federal Government understands that: the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty; the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies shall continue to be ensured by NATO or an equivalent security system; Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as the Declaration of Intent of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany; the Treaty shall not hamper the unification of the European States; the Parties to the Treaty will commence without delay the negotiations on disarmament envisaged under the Treaty, especially with regard to nuclear weapons.
The Federal Government declares that: signature of this Treaty does not imply recognition of the German Democratic Republic under international law; therefore, no relations under international law with the German Democratic Republic shall arise out of this Treaty for the Federal Republic of Germany.
With respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to the verification agreement to be concluded with the IAEA, the Federal Government starts from the following assumptions:
a) Limitation to the purpose of the Treaty.
It is the purpose of the Treaty to prevent the present non-nuclear-weapon States from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The provisions of the Treaty are therefore solely designed to attain this objective. In no case shall they lead to restricting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes by non-nuclear-weapon States.
Freedom of research and development is essential in the advancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to the Federal Republic of Germany it is beyond all doubt that the Treaty may never be interpreted or applied in such a way as to hamper or inhibit research and development in this sphere. The Federal Government has taken note of the statement made by the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations on 15 May 1968, and, in particular, of the following remarks:
«... there is no basis for any concern that this Treaty would impose inhibitions or restrictions on the opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon States to develop their capabilities in nuclear science and technology:» «This Treaty does not ask any country to accept a status of technological dependency or to be deprived of developments in nuclear research;» «The whole field of nuclear science associated with electric power production... will become more accessible under the Treaty to all who seek to exploit it. This includes not only the present generation of nuclear power reactors but also that advanced technology, which is still developing, of fast breeder power reactors which, in producing energy, also produce more fissionable material than they consume;» and «Many nations are now engaged in research in an even more advanced field of science, that of controlled thermo-nuclear fusion. The future developments of this science and technology may well lead to the nuclear reactor of the future, in which the fission process of uranium or plutonium is replaced by the fusion reactions of hydrogen isotopes as the source of energy. Controlled thermo-nuclear fusion technology will not be affected by the Treaty...»
In connection with paragraph 3 of Article III and with Article IV of the Treaty no nuclear activities in the fields of research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes are prohibited nor can the transfer of information, materials and equipment be denied to non-nuclear-weapon States merely on the basis of allegations that such activities or transfers could be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.
Article IV requires those Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Federal Government therefore expects that any measures restricting the unhampered flow of scientific and technological information will be re-examined with a view to facilitating the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.
e) Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.
At the present stage of technology nuclear explosive devices are those designed to release in microseconds in an uncontrolled manner a large amount of nuclear energy accompanied by shock waves, ie. devices that can be used as nuclear weapons. At the same time the Federal Government holds the view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must not hamper progress in the field of developing and applying the technology of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes.
f) Safeguards and Verification Agreements.
There is no incompatibility between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM. As to the safeguards provided for in its Article III, the Non-Proliferation Treaty limits itself to referring to agreements to be concluded with the IAEA, the contents of which have therefore not yet been laid down. The safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as described in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III, can be concluded by Parties to the Treaty not only «individually» but also «together with other States». States being members of an organization the work of which is related to that of the IAEA comply with their obligation to conclude the agreement by the organization concerned concluding it with the IAEA, as also provided in Article XVI of the Statute of the IAEA and in the Agency's safeguards. The obligation of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under paragraph 1 of Article III to accept safeguards outside its own territory prevails only if such Party has dominant and effective control over a nuclear facility.
In order to avoid incompatibility between the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and compliance with the provisions of the Treaty establishing EURATOM, the verification procedures must be so defined that the rights and obligations of member States and the Community remain unaffected, in accordance with the opinion rendered by the Commission under Article 103 of the Treaty establishing EURATOM.
To this end, the Commission of the European Communities will have to enter into negotiations with the IAEA. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany intends to post-pone the ratification procedure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty until negotiations between the Commission and the IAEA have led to agreement.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany reaffirms the attached Statement made by it on signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:
(1) welcomes the fact that the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has now been consolidated world-wide by treaty and points out that the Federal Republic of Germany has as early as October 1954, in the Brussels Treaty, renounced the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and accepted relevant controls;
(2) reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international d tente and peace, and that it will render an important contribution towards the creation of an international community based on the security of independent nations and on the progress of mankind;
(3) understands that the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty;
(4) understands that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany shall continue to be ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic of Germany for its part shall remain unrestrictedly committed to the collective security arrangements of NATO;
(5) understands that Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as the Declarations of Intent of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany;
(6) states that the principles contained in the Preamble to the Treaty, and the principles of international law laid down in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which preclude any threat or use of force directed against the territorial integrity or the political independence of a State, are the indispensable prerequisite to the Treaty itself and shall apply without any restriction also in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany;
(7) signs the Treaty in the expectation that it will encourage further agreements on the prohibition of the use and threat of force, which will serve to stabilize peace in Europe;
(8) states that the Federal Republic of Germany, in a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy, will remain free by invoking the principle of international law laid down in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to take the measures required to safeguard these interests;
(9) signs the Treaty convinced that it will not hamper European unification;
(10) regards the Treaty not as an end but rather a starting point for the negotiations, provided for in the Treaty itself as its natural supplement and to ensure its effective implementation, concerning disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the benefits arising for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy;
(11) stresses that the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the international or multinational co-operation in this field must not only not be hampered but should even be furthered by the Treaty, especially as regards non-nuclear-weapon States;
(12) notes that no incompatibility exists between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM;
(13) understands that the agreements between the IAEA and EURATOM as described in Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, shall be concluded on the basis of the principle of verification, and that verification shall take place in a way that does not affect the tasks of of the European Atomic Energy Community in the political, scientific, economic and technical fields;
(14) insists that, in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Treaty the safeguards shall only be applied to source and special fissionable material and in conformity with the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials at certain strategic points. It understands that the words «source material» and «special fissionable material» used in the Treaty shall have — subject to amendments expressly accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany — the meaning laid down in the present wording of Article XX of the Statute of the IAEA;
(15) understands that each Party to the Treaty shall decide for itself which «equipment or material» shall fall under the export provision of paragraph 2 of Article III. In so doing the Federal Republic of Germany will accept only those interpretations and definitions of the terms «equipment or material» which it has expressly approved;
(16) reaffirms the necessity of settling the question of the costs of safeguards in a way that does not place unfair burdens on non-nuclear-weapon States;
(17) declares that the Federal Republic of Germany does not intend to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty before an agreement in accordance with Article III of that Treaty has been concluded between EURATOM and the IAEA which both in form and substance meets the requirements of paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of this Statement and compatibility with the Treaty instituting the European Atomic Energy Community has been established;
(18) stresses the vital importance it attaches with a view to ensuring equal opportunities in the economic and scientific fields, to the fulfilment of the assurance given by the United States and Great Britain concerning the application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities, and hopes that other nuclear-weapon States as well will give similar assurances;
(19) reaffirms its view that, until the conclusion of the agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM, the supply contracts concluded between EURATOM and the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall remain in force and that, after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supply contracts should, in the interest of an unhampered exchange of information, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes, be freed from any additional political or administrative restrictions.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany signs today in Washington, London and Moscow, the capitals of the three Depository Governments, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
On this same day, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hands to the Depositary Governments — informing simultaneously the Governments of all States with which the Federal Republic of Germany maintains diplomatic relations — the text of a Note bringing the above Statement to the attention of these Governments. The Note also contains the known German interpretations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which are designed to preserve the sphere of peaceful activities and to ensure the conclusion of the verification agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM in accordance with Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Declarations on ratification (translation): With effect from the day on which the Treaty Enters into force for the Federal Republic of Germany it will also apply to Berlin (West) without affecting Allied rights and responsibilities, including those relating to demilitarisation.
Further declaration on ratification (translation): In connection with the deposit today of the instruments of ratification of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany sets out below in summary form the under- standing on which the Federal Republic of Germany becomes a Party to the Treaty and on which it commented in its Note and in its Statement of 28 November 1969 on the occasion of signing the Treaty.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:
1. reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international détente and peace, and that in particular the nuclear-weapon States will intensify their efforts in accordance with the undertaking and aims embodied in Article VI of the Treaty;
2. understands that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany continues to be ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic of Germany will for its part remain committed to the collective security arrangements of NATO;
3. states that no provision of the Treaty may be interpreted in such a way as to hamper the further development of European unification, especially the creation of a European Union with appropriate competence;
4. understands that research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as well as international and multinational cooperation in this field, must not be prejudiced by the Treaty;
5. understands that the application of the Treaty, including the implementation of safeguards, will not lead to discrimination of the nuclear industry of the Federal Republic of Germany in international competition;
6. stresses once again in this connection the vital importance it attaches to the undertaking given by the Government of the United States and by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities, and hopes that other nuclear-weapon States will assume similar obligations.»
«Вышеупомянутый Договор в день его вступления в силу для Федеративной Республики Германии вступает также в силу в отношении Земли Берлин, не затрагивая прав и ответственности Союзных властей и полномочий, которыми они наделены в области разоружения и демилитаризации».
«The Treaty applies in Land Berlin, taking into account the rights and responsibilities of the Allied authorities and the powers they retain in the fields of disarmament and demilitarization».
By a Note of 12 November 1975 (with reference to the declaration made by the Federal Republic of Germany on ratification on the application of the Treaty to Berlin (West)):
«Concerning the application of the above-mentioned treaty to Berlin (West) the German Democratic Republic states in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement concluded on 3 September 1971 between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and the French Republic that Berlin (West) is no constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and shall not be governed by it.»
The statement of the Federal Republic of Germany, according to which this treaty should also be applied to Berlin (West), contradicts the Quadripartite Agreement which stipulates that treaties concerning the affairs of security and status of Berlin (West) shall not be extended to Berlin (West) by the Federal Republic of Germany.
Accordingly, the declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany cannot have any legal effect.»
The signature of the Treaty by the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany was prefaced by the following:
«With reference to the note handed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Government of the United States of America in its capacity as depositary government.»
After signing the Treaty, the Ambassador handed the Secretary of State a note from the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as a statement by that Government. Translations of the note and statement, provided by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, read as follows:
«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the Government of the United States of America and, on the occasion and in formal connection with its signing today of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, has the honour to expound its understanding of the basis of that Treaty.»
«I. The Federal Government understands that»
- the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty;
- the security of the Federal Republic of Germany and its allies shall continue to be ensured by NATO or an equivalent security system;
- Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as the Declaration of Intent of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany;
- the Treaty shall not hamper the unification of the European States;
- the Parties to the Treaty will commence without delay the negotiations on disarmament envisaged under the Treaty, especially with regard to nuclear weapons.
«II. The Federal Government declares that»
- signature of this Treaty does not imply recognition of the GDR under international law;
- therefore, no relations under international law with the GDR shall arise out of this Treaty for the Federal Republic of Germany.
«III. With respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to the verification agreement to be concluded with the IAEA, the Federal Government starts from the following assumptions:»
(a) Limitation of the purpose of the Treaty
It is the purpose of the Treaty to prevent the present non-nuclear-weapon States from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The provisions of the Treaty are therefore solely designed to attain this objective. In no case shall they lead to restricting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes by non-nuclear-weapon States.
Freedom of research and development is essential in the advancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to the Federal Republic of Germany it is beyond all doubt that the Treaty may never be interpreted or applied in such a way as to hamper or inhibit research and development in this sphere.
The Federal Government has taken note of the statement made by the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations on 15 May 1968, and, in particular, of the following remarks:
«... there is no basis for any concern that this Treaty would impose inhibitions or restrictions on the opportunity for non-nuclear-weapon states to develop their capabilities in nuclear science and technology;»
«This Treaty does not ask any country to accept a status of technological dependency or to be deprived of developments in nuclear research;»
«The whole field of nuclear science associated with electric power production...... will become more accessible under the Treaty, to all who seek to exploit it. This includes not only the present generation of nuclear power reactors, but also that advanced technology, which is still developing of fast breeder power reactors, which, in producing energy, also produce more fissionable material than they consume;»
«Many nations are now engaged in research in an even more advanced field of science, that of controlled thermonuclear fusion. The future developments of this science and technology may well lead to the nuclear reactor of the future, in which the fission process of uranium or plutonium is replaced by the fusion reactions of hydrogen isotopes as the source of energy. Controlled thermonuclear fusion technology will not be affected by the Treaty...»
In connection with paragraph 3 of Article III and with Article IV of the Treaty no nuclear activities in the fields of research, development, manufacture or use for peaceful purposes are prohibited nor can the transfer of information, materials and equipment be denied to non-nuclear-weapon States merely on the basis of allegations that such activities or transfers could be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article IV requires those Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The Federal Government therefore expects that any measures restricting the unhampered flow of scientific and technological information will be re-examined with a view to facilitating the fullest possible exchange of scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes.
(e) Other nuclear explosive devices
At the present stage of technology nuclear explosive devices are those designed to release in microseconds in an uncontrollable manner a large amount of nuclear energy accompanied by shock waves, i.e. devices that can be used as nuclear weapons.
At the same time, the Federal Government holds the view that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must not hamper progress in the field of developing and applying the technology of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes.
(f) Safeguards and Verification Agreements
There is no incompatibility between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM. As to the safeguards provided for in its Article III, the Non-Proliferation Treaty limits itself to referring to agreements to be concluded with the IAEA, the contents of which have therefore not yet been laid down.
The safeguards agreements with the IAEA, as described in paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article III, can be concluded by Parties to the Treaty not only «individually» but also «together with other States». States being members of an organization the work of which is related to that of the IAEA comply with their obligation to conclude the agreement by the organization concerned concluding it with the IAEA, as also provided in Article XVI of the Statute of the IAEA and in the Agency's safeguards system.
The obligation of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under paragraph 1 of Article III to accept safeguards outside its own territory prevails only if such Party has dominant and effective control over a nuclear facility.
In order to avoid incompatibility between the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and compliance with the provisions of the Treaty establishing EURATOM, the verification procedures must be so defined that the rights and obligations of member states and the Community remain unaffected, in accordance with the opinion rendered by the Commission under Article 103 of the Treaty establishing EURATOM.
To this end, the Commission of the European Communities will have to enter into negotiations with the IAEA.
The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany intends to postpone the ratification procedure of the Non-Proliferation Treaty until negotiations between the Commission and the IAEA have led to agreement.
«IV. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany reaffirms the attached Statement made by it on signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty.»
«Statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons»
«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany»
«(1) welcomes the fact that the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has now been consolidated world-wide by treaty and points out that the Federal Republic of Germany has as early as October 1954, in the Brussels Treaty, renounced the manufacture of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and accepted relevant controls;»
«(2) reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international détente , and peace, and that it will render an important contribution towards the creation of an international community based on the security of independent nations and on the progress of mankind;»
«(3) understands that the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted and applied in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany in the same way as in relation to the other Parties to the Treaty;»
«(4) understands that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany shall continue to be ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic of Germany for its part shall remain unrestrictedly committed to the collective security arrangements of NATO;»
«(5) understands that Resolution No. 255 adopted by the United Nations Security Council, as well as Declarations of Intent of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union upon which that Resolution is based, shall also apply without any restriction to the Federal Republic of Germany;»
«(6) states that the principles contained in the Preamble to the Treaty, and the principles of international law laid down in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter which preclude any threat or use of force directed against the territorial integrity or the political independence of a State, are the indispensable prerequisite to the Treaty itself and shall apply without any restriction also in relation to the Federal Republic of Germany;»
«(7) signs the Treaty in the expectation that it will encourage further agreements on the prohibition of the use and threat of force, which will serve to stabilize peace in Europe;»
«(8) states that the Federal Republic of Germany, in a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy, will remain free by invoking the principle of international law laid down in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to take the measures required to safeguard these interests;»
«(9) signs the Treaty convinced that it will not hamper European unification;»
«(10) regards the Treaty not as an end but rather a starting point for the negotiations, provided for in the Treaty itself as its natural supplement and to ensure its effective implementation, concerning disarmament, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the benefits arising for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy;»
«(11) stresses that the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the international or multinational co-operation in this field must not only not be hampered but should even be furthered by the Treaty, especially as regards non-nuclear-weapon States;»
«(12) notes that no incompatibility exists between the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and those of the Treaty establishing EURATOM;»
«(13) understands that the agreements between the IAEA and EURATOM, as described in Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, shall be concluded on the basis of the principle of verification, and that verification shall take place in a way that does not affect the tasks of the European Atomic Energy Community in the political, scientific, economic and technical fields;»
«(14) insists that, in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, the safeguards shall only be applied to source and special fissionable material and in conformity with the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials at certain strategic points. It understands that the words „source material“ and „special fissionable material“ used in the Treaty shall have — subject to amendments expressly accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany — the meaning laid down in the present wording of Article IX of the Statute of the IAEA;»
«(15) understands that each Party to the Treaty shall decide for itself which „equipment or material“ shall fall under the export provision of paragraph 2 of Article III. In so doing the Federal Republic of Germany will accept only those interpretations and definitions of the terms „equipment or material“ which it has expressly approved;»
«(16) reaffirms the necessity of settling the question of the costs of safeguards in a way that does not place unfair burdens on non-nuclear-weapon States;»
«(17) declares that the Federal Republic of Germany does not intend to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty before an agreement in accordance with Article III of that Treaty has been concluded between EURATOM and the IAEA which both in form and substance meets the requirements of paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of this Statement and compatibility with the Treaty instituting the European Atomic Energy Community has been established;»
«(18) stresses the vital importance it attaches, with a view to ensuring equal opportunities in the economic and scientific fields, to the fulfilment of the assurance given by the United States and Great Britain concerning the application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities, and hopes that other nuclear-weapon States as well will give similar assurances;»
«(19) reaffirms its view that, until the conclusion of the agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM, the supply contracts concluded between EURATOM and the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty shall remain in force, and that, after the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, supply contracts should, in the interest of an unhampered exchange of information, equipment and materials for peaceful purposes, be freed from any additional political or administrative restrictions.»
«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany signs today in Washington, London and Moscow, the capitals of the three Depositary Governments, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.»
«On this same day, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany hands to the Depositary Governments — informing simultaneously the Governments of all States with which the Federal Republic of Germany maintains diplomatic relations — the text of a Note bringing the above Statement to the attention of these Governments. The Note also contains the known German interpretation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which are designed to preserve the sphere of peaceful activities and to ensure the conclusion of the verification agreement between the IAEA and EURATOM in accordance with Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.»
The instrument of ratification of the Treaty by the Federal Republic of Germany was accompanied by a declaration and a statement contained in notes from the Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, dated May 2, 1975, which read as follows:
«I have the honor to make the following declaration on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:»
«In connection with the deposit today of the instruments of ratification of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany sets out below in summary form the understanding on which the Federal Republic of Germany becomes a Party to the Treaty and on which it commented in its Note and in its Statement of 28 November 1969 on the occasion of signing the Treaty.»
«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany»
«1. reaffirms its expectation that the Treaty will be a milestone on the way towards disarmament, international détente , and peace, and that in particular the nuclear-weapon States will intensify their efforts in accordance with the undertaking and aims embodied in Article VI of the Treaty;»
«2. understands that the security of the Federal Republic of Germany continues to be ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic of Germany will for its part remain committed to the collective security arrangements of NATO;»
«3. states that no provision of the Treaty may be interpreted in such a way as to hamper the further development of European unification, especially the creation of a European Union with appropriate competences;»
«4. understands that research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as well as international and multinational co-operation in this field, must not be prejudiced by the Treaty;»
«5. understands that the application of the Treaty, including the implementation of safeguards, will not lead to discrimination of the nuclear industry of the Federal Republic of Germany in international competition;»
«6. stresses once again in this connection the vital importance it attaches to the undertaking given by the Government of the United States and by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the application of safeguards to their peaceful nuclear facilities, and hopes that other nuclear-weapon States will assume similar obligations.»
«The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany requests the Government of the United States of America to communicate the text of this declaration to all signatory and acceding States in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IX of the Treaty.»
«Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.»
«In connection with the deposit today of the instrument of ratification to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, I have the honor to state on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany that with effect from the day on which the Treaty enters into force for the Federal Republic of Germany it will also apply to Berlin (West) without affecting Allied rights and responsibilities, including those relating to demilitarization.»
«Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.»
In a Note dated 2 September, 1975, the Government of Grenada informed the Government of the United Kingdom that it confirmed its succession to the Treaty.
By a note of September 2, 1975, provided to the United States Government by the Government of the United Kingdom, the Ministry of External Affairs of Grenada made known its succession to the Treaty.
«1. This accession by the Holy See to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is inspired by its constant desire, illuminated by the teaching of universal brotherhood and of justice and peace between men and peoples contained in the Gospel message, to make its contribution to undertakings which, through disarmament as well as by other means, promote security, mutual trust and peaceful co-operation in relations between peoples. In that perspective, the Holy See judges — as is said in the official document of accession — that the aims of disarmament and easing of international tension by which the Treaty is inspired correspond with its own mission of peace, and that the Treaty, although it has its intrinsic limitations, constitutes a noteworthy step forward on the road to disarmament. In fact, in so far as the Treaty proposes to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons — while awaiting the achievement of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of complete nuclear disarmament — it has the aim of lessening the danger of terrible and total devastation which threatens all mankind, and it wishes to constitute a premise for wider agreements in the future for the promotion of a system of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.»
2. In the first place, therefore, the Holy See appreciates and shares the following considerations and intentions which the States Party to the Treaty have expressed or declared in the Preamble of the Treaty:
-
the awareness of the devastation «that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples»;
-
the reaffirmation of the principle that «in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted»;
-
the intention «to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament»;
-
the intention «to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control».
3. The Holy See is furthermore convinced that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be able to attain in full the noble objectives of security and peace which constitute the reasons for contracting it and justify the limitations to which the States Party to the Treaty submit only if it is fully executed in every clause and with all its implications. In the Holy See's View, that actuation concerns not only the obligations to be applied immediately but also those which envisage a process of ulterior commitments. Among the latter, the Holy See considers it suitable to point out the following:
a) The adoption of appropriate measures to ensure, on a basis of equality, that all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty will have available to them the benefits deriving from peaceful applications of nuclear technology, in the spirit of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Preamble, and in conformity with Articles IV and V of the Treaty;
b) The pursuit of negotiations in good faith «on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control», in accordance with the commitment foreseen in Article VI. The Holy See, therefore, expresses the sincere wish that these undertakings will be executed by all the Parties. In particular it declares its special interest and expresses its earnest desire:
-
that the current talks between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic armaments may soon lead to a satisfactory agreement which will make possible the cessation in an effective and lasting manner of the preoccupying arms race in that costly and murderous sector of warlike preparations, both offensive and defensive;
-
that the proposals and drafts of agreements which have been put forward for some time past by various sources, especially within the Conference of the United Nations Committee for Disarmament, and which concern complete nuclear disarmament, prohibition of bacteriological and chemical weapons and the limitation and control of conventional armaments, as well as the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, may attain speedy and concrete results, in conformity with the repeated resolutions of the United Nations Organization and in fulfilment of the justified and anxious expectations of men and peoples of every continent.
4. In the spirit of the considerations expressed above, which gave rise to and which accompany this accession to the Treaty, the Holy See is convinced that the attainment of the Treaty's aims of security and peace will be all the more complete and effective according as the extent of its application is the wider and more universal.»
«1. Настоящее присоединение Святейшего Престола к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия вызвано его неизменным стремлением — в свете содержащихся в евангелическом послании заветов вселенского братства, а также справедливости и мира между людьми и народами — к тому, чтобы внести свой собственный вклад в реализацию инициатив, которые, также путем разоружения, направлены на укрепление безопасности, взаимного доверия, мирного сотрудничества в отношениях между народами.»
С учетом такой перспективы Святейший Престол считает, как об этом сказано в официальном документе о присоединении, что конечные цели разоружения и разрядки, которыми руководствуется Договор, соответствуют миссии мира, и что в своих внутренне присущих пределах этот Договор составляет значительный шаг вперед на пути к разоружению. Действительно, в той мере, в которой он ставит задачей прекратить распространение такого оружия, пока не достигнуто прекращение гонки ядерного вооружения, и пока речь идет о достижении эффективных мер, направленных на обеспечение полного разоружения в этой области, настоящий Договор призван сократить опасность ужаса полного уничтожения, которое угрожает всему человечеству, и является предпосылкой заключения новых более широких соглашений, способных развивать систему всеобщего и полного разоружения под эффективным международным контролем.
2. Поэтому прежде всего Святейший Престол высоко оценивает и разделяет следующие соображения и намерения, которые были выражены странами-участницами Договора или заявлены в преамбуле самого Договора:
-
Осознание опустошительных последствий, «которые имела бы для всего человечества ядерная война, и вытекающей из этого необходимости приложить все усилия для предотвращения опасности возникновения такой войны и принять меры для обеспечения безопасности народов».
-
Подтверждение принципа, согласно которому «в соответствии с Уставом ООН государства воздерживаются в их международных отношениях от угрозы силой или ее применения как против территориальной неприкосновенности или политической независимости любого государства, так и каким-либо другим способом, несовместимым с целями Объединенных Наций, и что следует способствовать установлению и поддержанию мира и международной безопасности».
-
Намерение «по возможности скорее достигнуть прекращения гонки ядерных вооружений и принять эффективные меры в направлении ядерного разоружения».
-
Стремление «содействовать смягчению международной напряженности и укреплению доверия между государствами, с тем чтобы способствовать достижению прекращения производства ядерного оружия, уничтожению всех существующих его запасов и исключению ядерного оружия и средств его доставки из национальных арсеналов в соответствии с Договором о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем».
3. Святейший Престол убежден кроме того в том, что Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия сможет полностью достичь благородных целей безопасности и мира, которые составляют основу его положений и оправдывают те ограничения, которые принимают на себя страны-участницы договора, лишь если он будет полностью исполняться в каждом его положении и на протяжении всего его действия.
По его мнению, такое исполнение касается не только обязательств по непосредственному применению, но также и обязательств, которые предполагают принятие ряда последующих обязательств, из которых Святейший Престол считает своевременным подчеркнуть следующие:
а) принятие соответствующих мер с тем, чтобы на основе равенства обеспечить всем неядерным в военном отношении странам-участницам Договора преимущества, вытекающие из мирного использования ядерной технологии, в духе абзацев 4, 5, 6 и 7 преамбулы и в соответствии со статьями IV и V самого Договора.
б) Ведение в духе доброй воли переговоров «об эффективных мерах по прекращению гонки ядерных вооружений в ближайшем будущем и ядерному разоружению, а также о Договоре о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем» в соответствии с обязательством, зафиксированным в статье VI.
Святейший Престол выражает таким образом пожелание, чтобы названные обязательства исполнялись всеми странами-участницами Договора. В частности он отмечает свою особую заинтересованность, выражая горячее пожелание, чтобы:
-
Продолжающиеся переговоры между СССР и США по ограничению стратегических вооружений могли в ближайшем будущем привести к удовлетворительной договоренности, которая могла бы эффективным и прочным образом остановить вызывающую озабоченность гонку вооружений в такой расточительной и смертоносной области военных приготовлений, как наступательное иди оборонительное оружие;
-
Предложения и проекты соглашений, которые на протяжении некоторого времени поступают с различных сторон, в частности в рамках Конференции Комитета Объединенных Наций по разоружению, и которые касаются полного ядерного разоружения, запрещения бактериологического и химического оружия, ограничения и установления контроля над обычными вооружениями, а также проект Договора о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем, могли бы привести к быстрым и конкретным результатам в соответствии с неоднократными резолюциями ООН в ответ на оправданные тревожные ожидания людей и народов всех континентов.
4. В духе вышеизложенных соображений, которые мотивируют и сопровождают настоящее присоединение к Договору, Святейший Престол выражает убежденность, что цели безопасности и мира, которые являются целями Договора, будут осуществлены тем более полно и эффективно, чем более широким и универсальным будет его применение».
A declaration was annexed to the instrument of accession to the Treaty by the Holy See, the text of which reads as follows:
«1. This accession by the Holy See to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is inspired by its constant desire, illuminated by the teaching of universal brotherhood and of justice and peace between men and peoples contained in the Gospel message to make its contribution to undertakings which, through disarmament as well as by other means, promote security, mutual trust and peaceful co-operation in relations between peoples.»
In that perspective, the Holy See judges — as is said in the official document of accession — that the aims of disarmament and easing of international tension by which the Treaty is inspired correspond with its own mission of peace, and that the Treaty, although it has its intrinsic limitations, constitutes a noteworthy step forward on the road to disarmament. In fact, in so far as the Treaty proposes to stop the dissemination of nuclear weapons — while awaiting the achievement of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the undertaking of effective measures in the direction of complete nuclear disarmament — it has the aim of lessening the danger of terrible and total devastation which threatens all mankind, and it wishes to constitute a premise for wider agreements in the future for the promotion of a system of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.
«2. In the first place, therefore, the Holy See appreciates and shares the following considerations and intentions which the States Party to the Treaty have expressed or declared in the Preamble of the Treaty:»
-
The awareness of the devastation @that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples»;
-
The reaffirmation of the principle that «in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted»;
-
The intention «to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament»;
-
The intention «to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control».
«3. The Holy See is furthermore convinced that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will be able to attain in full the noble objectives of security and peace which constitute the reasons for contracting it and justify the limitations to which the States Party to the Treaty submit only if it is fully executed in every clause and with all its implications.»
In the Holy See's view, that actuation concerns not only the obligations to be applied immediately but also those which envisage a process of ulterior commitments. Among the latter, the Holy See considers it suitable to point out the following:
a) The adoption of appropriate measures to ensure, on a basis of equality, that all non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty will have available to them the benefits deriving from peaceful applications of nuclear technology, in the spirit of paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Preamble, and in conformity with articles IV and V of the Treaty;
b) The pursuit of negotiations in good faith «on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control», in accordance with the commitment foreseen in article VI.
The Holy See, therefore, expresses its sincere wish that these undertakings will be executed by all the Parties. In particular it declares its special interest and expresses its earnest desire:
-
That the current talks between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic armaments may soon lead to a satisfactory agreement which will make possible the cessation in an effective and lasting manner of the preoccupying arms race in that costly and murderous sector of warlike preparations, both offensive and defensive;
-
That the proposals and drafts of agreements which have been put forward for some time past by various sources, especially within the Conference of the United Nations Committee for Disarmament, and which concern complete nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of bacteriological and chemical weapons and the limitation and control of conventional armaments, as well as the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, may attain speedy and concrete results, in conformity with the repeated resolutions of the United Nations Organization and in fulfilment of the justified and anxious expectations of men and peoples of every continent.
«4. In the spirit of the considerations expressed above, which gave rise to and which accompany this accession to the Treaty, the Holy See is convinced that the attainment of the Treaty's aims of security and peace will be all the more complete and effective according as the extent of its application is the wider and more universal.»
«From the Vatican, 25 February 1971.»
By a Note of 2 July 1975 (with reference to the declaration made by the Federal Republic of Germany on ratification on the application of the Treaty to Berlin (West)):
«Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Part A of Annex IV of the Quadripartite Agreement dated 3 September 1971, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as well as the United States of America have engaged themselves to maintain their rights and responsibilities concerning matters of security and status of the Western Sectors of Berlin. Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot represent the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin in questions of security and status and, thus, neither can it extend the validity of international conventions dealing with such questions over the Western Sectors of Berlin.»
Owing to the fact that the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons affects directly the questions of security and status, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic considers the Declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany aimed at the application of the Treaty on Berlin (West) contrary to the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 and, therefore, unacceptable.»
The Government of Indonesia has decided to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the conviction that it will serve as an important step towards effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
Together with the Non-Aligned Countries, it is the consistent policy of the Government of Indonesia to support all efforts to achieve a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to direct all endeavours towards the exclusive peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The Indonesian Government is already party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and it has always supported draft proposals designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the present Treaty could be effective only if all countries, nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, could become party to this Treaty.
The Indonesian Government takes special note of Article III, paragraph 3, stating that the safeguards required by the Treaty shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties, or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. It is therefore the common task of all parties to this Treaty to make the relevant safeguards agreement acceptable to all.
The Government of Indonesia, further, attached great importance to the declarations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, affirming their intention to seekSecurity Council action in order to provide or supportimmediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Of utmost importance, however, is not the action after a nuclear attack has been committed but the guarantees to prevent such an attack. The Indonesian Government truest that the nuclear-weapon-States will study further this question of effective measures to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.
It is in this context that the Indonesian Government feels obliged to state, further, that its decision to sign the Treaty is not to be taken in any way as a decision to ratify the Treaty. Its ratification will be considered after matters of national security, which are of deep concern to the Government and people of Indonesia, have been clarified to their satisfaction.
«Правительство Индонезии решило подписать Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия с уверенностью, что он будет служить важным шагом на пути эффективных действий по прекращению гонки ядерного вооружения и ядерного разоружения.»
Вместе с неприсоединившимися странами Правительство Индонезии проводит последовательную политику по поддержанию всех усилий по достижению договора о всестороннем запрещении испытании ядерного оружия и направлению всех стремлений по пути использования ядерной энергии только в мирных целях. Индонезийское правительство уже является участником Договора о частичном запрещении ядерного оружия 1963 года, и оно всегда, поддерживало проект предложений, направленных на ограничение распространения ядерного оружия.
Несомненно, что настоящий Договор может быть эффективен только в том случае, если все страны, как обладающие, так и не обладающие ядерным оружием, станут участниками этого Договора.
Индонезийское правительство обращает специальное внимание на ст. III, параграф 3, в котором говорится, что гарантии, требуемые Договором, будут осуществляться таким образом, чтобы избегать препятствий для экономического или технологического развития участников Договора или международного сотрудничества в области мирной ядерной деятельности.
Поэтому общей задачей всех участников этого Договора является принятие соответствующего соглашения о гарантиях, приемлемого для всех.
Индонезийское правительство будет и в дальнейшем придавать большое значение Декларации Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Советского Союза, подтверждающей их намерение добиваться принятия Советом Безопасности действий с целью обеспечить или оказать немедленную помощь любому государству-участнику Договора, не обладающему ядерным оружием, который является жертвой акта агрессии или объектом угрозы агрессии, где может быть использовано ядерное оружие. Однако крайне важным является такое действие не после совершения ядерного нападения, а гарантии по предотвращению подобного нападения. Индонезийское правительство убеждено, что государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, будут изучать и дальше этот вопрос об эффективных мерах по обеспечению безопасности стран, не обладающих ядерным оружием.
Именно в этом свете индонезийское правительство считает необходимым также заявить, что его решение подписать Договор ни в какой мере не может рассматриваться как решение ратифицировать этот Договор. Вопрос о ратификации будет рассмотрен после того, как проблемы национальной безопасности, которые глубоко волнуют правительство и народ Индонезии, будут выяснены к их удовлетворению».
«1. Правительство Индонезии приняло решение сдать сегодня на хранение ратификационную грамоту к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия. При подписании Договора от 2 марта 1970 г. Правительство Индонезии заявило о том, что ратифицирует данный договор только после того, как будут учтены должным образом все аспекты национальной безопасности военного, экономического и социального характера.»
В настоящее время Индонезия активно осуществляет свое национальное развитие. Исходя из поддержания и ускорения процесса развития, включая экономическое и социальное развитие, Индонезия изначально решила использовать ядерную энергию для мирных целей. Усилия Индонезии по использованию ядерной энергии для мирных целей в своем национальном развитии требуют помощи и содействия технически развитых ядерных государств. Ратифицируя данный Договор, Правительство Индонезии желает обратить внимание ядерных государств на возложенные на них обязательства, содержащиеся в ст. 4 Договора, и выражает надежду на то, что они готовы сотрудничать с неядерными государствами по вопросу использования ядерной энергии в мирных целях и исполнять положения ст. 4 Договора на благо развивающихся стран на недискриминационной основе.
Если, с одной стороны, государства-участники Договора, не владеющие ядерным оружием, в соответствии со ст. 2 Договора обязаны не получать, не владеть или не производить ядерное оружие, Индонезия, с другой стороны, придерживается точки зрения, согласно которой государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, должны в равной мере соблюдать положения ст. 6 Договора, касающиеся прекращения гонки ядерного вооружения.
Сдавая на хранение настоящую ратификационную грамоту, Индонезия уверена в том, что став участницей данного Договора, она будет способствовать осуществлению усилий, предпринимаемых международным сообществом, по укреплению международного мира и безопасности».
1. The Government of Indonesia has decided to deposit today the Instrument of Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In signing the Treaty on 2 March 1970 the Government of Indonesia stated that it would ratify the same only after all aspects of national security of military, economic and social natures have been duly considered.
2. Indonesia today is actively carrying out its national development. With a view to supporting and accelerating the development process, including the economic and social development, Indonesia has decided from the outset to make use of the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Indonesia's efforts in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in its national development, require the assistance and cooperation of technologically advanced nuclear countries. With the ratification of this Treaty, the Government of Indonesia wishes to draw the attention of the nuclear countries to their obligations under Article IV of the Treaty and expresses the hope that they would be prepared to cooperate with non-nuclear countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and implement the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty for the benefit of developing countries without discrimination.
3. If, on the one hand, States Parties to the Treaty which are not in possession of nuclear weapons have, under Article II of the Treaty, the obligation not to receive, possess or manufacture nuclear weapons, Indonesia holds, on the other hand, the view that nuclear weapons states should equally observe the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.
4. By depositing this Instrument of Ratification Indonesia is confident that in becoming Party to the Treaty it would contribute to the efforts made by the international community in the strengthening of international peace and security.
«Правительство Индонезии решило подписать Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия с уверенностью, что он будет служить важным шагом на пути эффективных действий по прекращению гонки ядерного вооружения и ядерного разоружения.»
Вместе с неприсоединившимися странами Правительство Индонезии проводит последовательную политику по поддержанию всех усилий по достижению договора о всестороннем запрещении испытании ядерного оружия и направлению всех стремлений по пути использования ядерной энергии только в мирных целях. Индонезийское правительство уже является участником Договора о частичном запрещении ядерного оружия 1963 года, и оно всегда, поддерживало проект предложений, направленных на ограничение распространения ядерного оружия.
Несомненно, что настоящий Договор может быть эффективен только в том случае, если все страны, как обладающие, так и не обладающие ядерным оружием, станут участниками этого Договора.
Индонезийское правительство обращает специальное внимание на ст. III, параграф 3, в котором говорится, что гарантии, требуемые Договором, будут осуществляться таким образом, чтобы избегать препятствий для экономического или технологического развития участников Договора или международного сотрудничества в области мирной ядерной деятельности.
Поэтому общей задачей всех участников этого Договора является принятие соответствующего соглашения о гарантиях, приемлемого для всех.
Индонезийское правительство будет и в дальнейшем придавать большое значение Декларации Соединенных Штатов Америки, Соединенного Королевства и Советского Союза, подтверждающей их намерение добиваться принятия Советом Безопасности действий с целью обеспечить или оказать немедленную помощь любому государству-участнику Договора, не обладающему ядерным оружием, который является жертвой акта агрессии или объектом угрозы агрессии, где может быть использовано ядерное оружие. Однако крайне важным является такое действие не после совершения ядерного нападения, а гарантии по предотвращению подобного нападения. Индонезийское правительство убеждено, что государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, будут изучать и дальше этот вопрос об эффективных мерах по обеспечению безопасности стран, не обладающих ядерным оружием.
Именно в этом свете индонезийское правительство считает необходимым также заявить, что его решение подписать Договор ни в какой мере не может рассматриваться как решение ратифицировать этот Договор. Вопрос о ратификации будет рассмотрен после того, как проблемы национальной безопасности, которые глубоко волнуют правительство и народ Индонезии, будут выяснены к их удовлетворению».
«1. Правительство Индонезии приняло решение сдать сегодня на хранение ратификационную грамоту к Договору о нераспространении ядерного оружия. При подписании Договора от 2 марта 1970 г. Правительство Индонезии заявило о том, что ратифицирует данный договор только после того, как будут учтены должным образом все аспекты национальной безопасности военного, экономического и социального характера.»
В настоящее время Индонезия активно осуществляет свое национальное развитие. Исходя из поддержания и ускорения процесса развития, включая экономическое и социальное развитие, Индонезия изначально решила использовать ядерную энергию для мирных целей. Усилия Индонезии по использованию ядерной энергии для мирных целей в своем национальном развитии требуют помощи и содействия технически развитых ядерных государств. Ратифицируя данный Договор, Правительство Индонезии желает обратить внимание ядерных государств на возложенные на них обязательства, содержащиеся в ст. 4 Договора, и выражает надежду на то, что они готовы сотрудничать с неядерными государствами по вопросу использования ядерной энергии в мирных целях и исполнять положения ст. 4 Договора на благо развивающихся стран на недискриминационной основе.
Если, с одной стороны, государства-участники Договора, не владеющие ядерным оружием, в соответствии со ст. 2 Договора обязаны не получать, не владеть или не производить ядерное оружие, Индонезия, с другой стороны, придерживается точки зрения, согласно которой государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, должны в равной мере соблюдать положения ст. 6 Договора, касающиеся прекращения гонки ядерного вооружения.
Сдавая на хранение настоящую ратификационную грамоту, Индонезия уверена в том, что став участницей данного Договора, она будет способствовать осуществлению усилий, предпринимаемых международным сообществом, по укреплению международного мира и безопасности».
A statement was issued by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the date of its signature of the Treaty, the text of which reads as follows:
«The Government of Indonesia has decided to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the conviction that it will serve as an important step towards effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.»
«Together with the non-aligned countries, it is the consistent policy of the Government of Indonesia to support all efforts to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to direct all endeavours towards the exclusive peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The Indonesian Government is already party to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and it has always supported draft proposals designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.»
«There is no doubt that the present Treaty could be effective only if all countries, nuclear weapon as well as non nuclear weapon states could become party to this Treaty.»
«The Indonesian Government takes special note of Article III paragraph 3, stating that the safeguards required by the Treaty shall be implemented in such a manner so as to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. It is, therefore, the common task of all parties to this Treaty to make the relevant safeguards agreements acceptable to all.»
«The Government of Indonesia further attaches great importance to the declarations of the U.S.A., the U.K. and the Soviet Union, affirming their intention to render immediate assistance to any non-nuclear weapon state, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression, in which nuclear weapons are used. Of utmost importance, however, is not the action after a nuclear attack has been committed, but the guarantees to prevent such an attack. The Indonesian Government trusts that the nuclear weapon states will study further this question of effective measures to ensure the security of the non-nuclear weapon states.»
«It is in this context that the Indonesian Government feels obliged to state further that its decision to sign the Treaty is not to be taken in any way as a decision to ratify the Treaty. Its ratification will be considered after matters of national security, which are of deep concern to the Government and people of Indonesia, have been clarified to their satisfaction.»
The instrument of ratification of the Treaty by Indonesia was accompanied by a declaration, the text of which reads as follows:
«1. The Government of Indonesia has decided to deposit today the Instrument of Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In signing the Treaty on 2 March 1970 the Government of Indonesia stated that it would ratify the same only after all aspects of national security of military, economic and social natures have been duly considered.»
«2. Indonesia today is actively carrying out its national development. With a view to supporting and accelerating the development process, including the economic and social development, Indonesia has decided from the outset to make use of the nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Indonesia's efforts in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in its national development, require the assistance and cooperation of technologically advanced nuclear countries. With the ratification of this Treaty, the Government of Indonesia wishes to draw the attention of the nuclear countries to their obligations under Article IV of the Treaty and expresses the hope that they would be prepared to cooperate with non-nuclear countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and implement the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty for the benefit of developing countries without discrimination.»
«3. If, on the one hand, States Parties to the Treaty which are not in possession of nuclear weapons, have, under Article II of the Treaty, the obligation not to receive, possess or manufacture nuclear weapons, Indonesia holds, on the other hand, the view that nuclear weapons states should equally observe the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty relating to the cessation of nuclear arms race.»
«4. By depositing this Instrument of Ratification Indonesia is confident that in becoming Party to the Treaty it would contribute to the efforts made by the international community in the strengthening of international peace and security.»
The Italian Government, in signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, wish to confirm the statements made on the Treaty in various international fora and approved by the Italian Parliament in the debate that took place during the second half of July and at the end of August, 1968. On the basis of the above mentioned statements the Italian Government:
1 — reaffirm their firm belief that the Treaty — for which the Italian Government have made for years all possible efforts with a view to its early conclusion — is a milestone on the road to disarmament, international detente and peace, and represents a fundamental contribution for the establishment of a new international society based on security of peoples and on the progress of humanity;
2 — stress their persuasion that the principles set forth in the clauses of the Preamble to the Treaty on the engagement of signatories, in accordance with the UN Charter, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, are an intransgressible presupposition of the Treaty itself, and that a scrupulous and general respect for such principles constitutes a supreme interest for all;
3 — consider the Treaty not as a point of arrival, but only as a point of departure towards negotiations on disarmament, on peaceful use of nuclear energy and on benefits deriving from the peaceful use of nuclear energy which the Treaty itself takes into consideration for its natural completion and for its effective execution;
4 — sign the Treaty in the firm belief that nothing in it is an obstacle to the unification of the Countries of Western Europe and to the justified expectations that the peoples of this area have in the developments and progress towards unity with a view to the creation of a European entity;
5 — are convinced that the purposes of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are consistent with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome on EURATOM;
6 — note the full compatibility of the Treaty with the existing security agreements;
7 — note that the needs of freedom of scientific and technological research — that cannot be derogated from — are in no way hindered by the Treaty;
8 — note that the prohibitions in Articles I and II of the Treaty — also in the general spirit of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation — refer only to nuclear explosive devices that cannot be differentiated from nuclear weapons; and consequently that when technological progress will allow the development of peaceful explosive devices differentiated from nuclear weapons, the prohibition relating to their manufacture and use shall no longer apply;
9 — with reference to the provisions of Article III, paragraph 4, of the Treaty, express the hope that the agreements in the matter of controls foreseen in it will be reached between the IAEA and EURATOM on the basis of the concept of verification. Pending the conclusion of the Agreement between IAEA and EURATOM, the understandings reached on the matter of supplies between EURATOM and the Governments which have signed the Treaty will remain in force;
10 — note that in the letter and in the spirit of the Treaty the controls provided for in Article III of the Treaty are applicable only to source and special fissionable material. Consider that the words «source» and «special fissionable material» used in the Treaty should be understood — unless modifications are expressly accepted by Italy — in the meaning defined in the present text of Article XX of the Statute of IAEA;
11 — interpret the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 3, of the Treaty relating to the definition of a nuclear weapon State, in the sense that it refers only to the five Countries that have manufactured or exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before 1st January, 1967. Any claim to belong to this category, and for any title, shall not be recognized by the Italian Government to other States, whether or not they have signed the Treaty;
12 — state here and now that the signature and ratification of the Treaty by the Government of a Union of States covers the signature and ratification that might be carried out by the Governments of States members of the said Union: the Italian Government therefore would not recognize legal effects to the latter signature and ratification. To integrate the above mentioned statements the Italian Government attach to the present Note the texts of the ordini del giorni on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, approved by the Italian Senate and the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the 19th and 26th July, 1968.
Agenda approved by the Senate of the [Italian] Republic on 19 July, 1968
«The Senate, having heard the Government's statements on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; conscious of the threat which nuclear weapons constitute mankind; convinced that without universal nuclear disarmament there is no certainty that mankind will be spared the horrors of a nuclear war; trusts that all the nuclear-weapon Powers will agree to the general and effective discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and of the production of new nuclear weapons and the progressive destruction of existing stockpiles at an early date; considers that the implementation of disarmament by means of the destruction of existing stockpiles should be followed by the limitation of conventional weapons under strict control so as to make it impossible to resort to war as a means of settling disputes between States; lends its own support to the Government's decision to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and directs it to act in such a manner that the obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon Powers in respect of nuclear disarmament may be implemented as soon as possible as the first step towards general and complete disarmament; likewise directs the Government to ensure that the implementation of the Treaty secures the balance between responsibilities and obligations for the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Powers envisaged in the UN resolution, so that the non-nuclear-weapon Powers are assured of the right to fair supplies of source and special fissionable materials, of the right to unrestricted scientific and technical information and in general of effective equality between States in the sphere of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes Having considered Italy's obligations under the Treaty of Rome and the value of the policy of European unification, calls upon the Government to act in agreement with the other members of the European Communities in such a way that the existence and development of the European Communities may be safeguarded during the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.»
Agenda approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 26 July, 1968
«The Chamber, having heard the Government's statements on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; convinced that any approach to general disarmament and nuclear disarmament in particular can be of use for the maintenance of peace in the world; considering that adherence to the Treaty by a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States may lead to appropriate negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament; authorizes the Government to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Directs the Government itself to ensure that:»
-
the obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon Powers in respect of nuclear disarmament are swiftly implemented;
-
the non-nuclear-weapon Powers are assured of supplies, on non-discriminatory conditions, of source and special fissionable materials for peace purposes, within the meaning laid down by the Statute of the IAEA, and also the right to unrestricted scientific and technical information;
-
it avails itself of the right of initiative provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty in order that all the States acceding thereto may achieve effective equality in participation in the control and peaceful development of nuclear energy;
-
all such initiatives are taken as are most suitable for the attainment of these objectives on the occasion, too, of the conference of non-nuclear-weapon States which will open under the auspices of the United Nations at Geneva in August 1968. Such assurances may well be obtained by means of additional agreements and explanatory declarations signed by as many countries as possible; and calls upon the Government to act in agreement with the other Member-States of the European Communities to ensure that, when the Treaty is implemented, the existence and development of the European Communities is safeguarded, the possibility of collective control over nuclear weapons is guarantied and an agreement concerning safeguards is concluded between EURATOM and the IAEA.»
The above statement was confirmed on ratification on 2 May, 1975.
«Итальянское правительство, подписывая Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия, желает повторить заявления, сделанные им в отношении Договора в различных международных организациях и одобренные парламентом Республики в ходе дебатов, состоявшихся во второй половине июля и в начале августа прошлого года.»
На основе этих заявлений Итальянское правительство:
-
вновь подтверждает свою глубокую убежденность в том, что Договор, скорейшему заключению которого оно всячески стремилось содействовать в течение ряда лет, является вехой на пути разоружения, разрядки международной напряженности и мира и представляет собой существенный вклад в создание нового международного сообщества, основанного на безопасности народов и прогрессе человечества;
-
подчеркивает собственную уверенность в том, что принципы, вытекающие из положений преамбулы Договора и касающиеся обязательства государств-участников в соответствии с Уставом ООН воздерживаться в своих международных отношениях от угрозы силой или ее применения против территориальной неприкосновенности или политической независимости любого государства, являются неотъемлемой частью договора и их тщательное и полное соблюдение в высшей степени соответствует интересам всех государств;
-
рассматривает Договор не как конечный пункт, а как отправную точку на пути к переговорам по разоружению, мирному использованию ядерной энергии и предоставлению благ, вытекающих из мирного применения ядерной энергии, которые должны явиться естественный развитием Договора и содействовать его эффективному выполнению;
-
подписывает Договор, будучи убежденным в том, что ничто в нем не препятствует объединению стран Западной Европы и осуществлению надежд, которые народы этого района связывают с развитием объединительного процесса, имеющего своей целью создание европейского сообщества;
-
убеждено, что цели Договора о нераспространении совместимы с нормами Римского Договора о Евратоме;
-
учитывает полную совместимость Договора с существующими обязательствами по вопросам безопасности;
-
принимает во внимание, что Договор ни в коей мере не ограничивает необходимость полной свободы в проведении научно-технических исследований.
-
констатирует, что запрещения, накладываемые статьями I и II Договора и соответствующие общему духу Договора, касаются только ядерных взрывных устройств, не отличающихся от ядерного оружия; и поэтому, когда технологический прогресс сделает возможным появление ядерных взрывных устройств для мирных целей, которые будут отличны от ядерного оружия, то запрещение не будет распространяться на их производство и использование;
-
в связи с положениями пункта 4 статьи III Договора ожидает, что предусматриваемые в нем соглашения по вопросам контроля будут заключены между МАГАТЭ и Евратомом на основе концепции проверки. В период до заключения соглашения между Евратомом и МАГАТЭ существующие соглашения относительно поставок между Евратомом и правительствами стран, подписавших Договор, останутся в силе;
-
принимает к сведению, что в соответствии с буквой и духом Договора контроль, о котором речь идет в статье III Договора, будет применяться только в отношении исходного и специального расщепляющегося материала. Полагает, что слова «исходный материал» и «специальный расщепляющийся материал», употребляемые в Договоре, следует понимать — за исключением изменений, безусловно принятых Италией — так, как они определены в нынешнем тексте статьи XX Статута МАГАТЭ;
-
истолковывает положение пункта 3 статьи IX Договора, касающееся определения государства, обладающего ядерным оружием, в том плане, что речь идет исключительно о пяти странах, которые произвели или взрывали ядерное оружие или другое ядерное взрывное устройство до I января 1967 года. Никакие претензии на принадлежность к этой или подобной категории не будут признаваться Итальянским правительством за другими государствами, как присоединившимися, так и неприсоединившимися к Договору;
-
заявляет уже сейчас, что подписание и ратификация Договора правительством союза государств заменит в конечном итоге подписание и ратификацию его со стороны правительств государств-членов этого союза: итальянское правительство не будет признавать как имеющие юридическую силу, подписание и ратификацию Договора последними».
The Government of Japan, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the danger of nuclear war, has always been in favour of the spirit underlying this Treaty, since the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in accord with its policy with regard to the maintenance of world peace. The Government of Japan is signing this Treaty on the basis of its fundamental position which is stated below.
The Government of Japan is convinced that this Treaty will serve as a first step towards nuclear disarmament and hopes that as many States as possible will adhere to this Treaty to make it effective. The Government of Japan hopes, especially, that the Governments of the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China which possess nuclear weapons but have yet to express their intention of adhering to this Treaty will become parties thereto at an early date and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament and that they will refrain, even before that, from taking such actions as are contrary to the purposes of this Treaty. This Treaty permits only the present nuclear-weapon States to possess nuclear weapons. This discrimination should ultimately be made to disappear through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States from their national arsenals. Until such time the nuclear-weapon States should be conscious of the fact that they have special responsibilities as a consequence of this special status.
The prohibition under this Treaty applies solely to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and of control over them. Therefore this Treaty must in no way restrict non-nuclear-weapon States in their research, development or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or in their international cooperation in these fields, nor must it subject them to discriminatory treatment in any aspect of such activities. The Government of Japan wishes to state that it has a deep interest in the following matters in the light of its basic position stated above.
This Government stresses that it will also concern itself most vigourously with these matters when it decides to ratify the Treaty as well as when it participates in the review of its operation in the future as a party to the Treaty.
1. Under Article VI of the Treaty each State Party «undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control». The Government of Japan believe it essential for the attainment of the purposes of this Treaty that, above all, the nuclear-weapon States should take concrete nuclear disarmament measures in pursuance of this undertaking. As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, Japan is also prepared to cooperate in the furtherance of disarmament.
2. The Government of Japan deems it important that in the preamble to the Treaty there is a provision stating that «in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations». It also wishes to emphasise that the nuclear-weapon States must not have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
3. The Government of Japan also attaches great importance to the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union affirming their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will continue their studies with regard to effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.
4. The Government of Japan, pending its ratification of this Treaty, will pay particular attention to developments in disarmament negotiations and will progress in the implementation of the Security Council Resolution on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and continue to make a close study of other problems which require consideration for the safeguarding of her national interests.
5. The Government of Japan takes note of the fact that Article X of the Treaty provides that: «each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardised the supremeinterest of its country.»
II. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
1. The safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must not be such as would subject her to disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards agreements which other States Parties conclude with the same Agency, either individually or together with other States. The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration to this matter before taking steps to ratify the Treaty.
2. The Government of Japan greatly appreciates, as a measure supplementing this Treaty, the declarations of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which are both nuclear-weapon States, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all their nuclear activities, excluding only those directly related to their national security, and earnestly hopes that these assurances will be faithfully implemented. It also hopes most earnestly that the other nuclear-weapon States will take similar action.
3. Safeguards should be subject to the principle that they should be applied at certain strategic points of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the procedure for their application must be rational when considered from the point of view of cost-effectiveness and made as simple as possible by making the maximum use of material control systems of the respective countries. Furthermore, adequate measures must be taken to ensure that the application of safeguards does not cause the leakage of industrial secrets or otherwise hinder industrial activities. The Government of Japan hopes that the International Atomic Energy Agency will make constant efforts to improve safeguards in the light of technological developments with the above aims in mind. This Government is prepared to cooperate in such efforts and hopes that the States concerned will also cooperate to achieve this end.
4. The Government of Japan understands that no unfair burden in connection with the cost of applying safeguards will be imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon States to which such safeguards are to be applied.
5. The Government of Japan considers that, when safeguards are applied in accordance with the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency under Article III of this Treaty, steps should be taken to arrange that such safeguards supersede the existing safeguards which are being applied in connection with Japan's cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
6. Concrete measures should be taken to promote the implementation of the provisions of Articles IV and V of the Treaty relating to International Cooperation for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and for the Peaceful Application of Nuclear Explosions. In particular, no peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited or restricted, nor shall the transfer of information, nuclear materials, equipment or other material relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy be denied to non-nuclear States, merely on the grounds that such activities or transfers could be used also for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
«Правительство Японии, будучи убежденным, что распространение ядерного оружия увеличивает опасность ядерной войны, согласилось с духом этого Договора, поскольку предотвращение распространения ядерного оружия согласуется с политикой Правительства Японии, направленной на сохранение всеобщего мира.»
Правительство Японии подписывает настоящий Договор на основе нижеизложенных основных соображений.
Правительство Японии выражает надежду на то, что настоящий Договор послужит первым шагом к ядерному разоружению, и выражает пожелание, чтобы как можно больше государств присоединилось к настоящему Договору с тем, чтобы сделать его эффективным. В особенности правительство Японии желает, чтобы правительств Французской Республики и Китайской Народной Республики, которые обладают ядерным оружием и которые еще не проявили намерения присоединиться к настоящему Договору, как можно быстрее присоединились к Договору и искренне пошли на переговоры о ядерном разоружении, а также чтобы до этого они не пошли на действия, противоречащие целям настоящего Договора.
Настоящий Договор признает обладание ядерным оружием лишь за нынешними ядерными державами. Такая дискриминация в конечном счете должна быть ликвидирована путем устранения ядерными державами ядерного оружия из арсенала своих вооружений, до этого момента ядерные державы должны сознавать, что они находятся в особом положении и в то же время несут особую ответственность.
Объектом настоящего Договора является запрещение лишь приобретения ядерного оружия и других ядерных взрывных устройств, а также контроль над таким оружием и взрывными устройствами. Ввиду этого неядерные страны ни в коем случае не должны быть ограничены настоящим Договором в отношении исследования, развития и осуществления мирного использования атомной энергии, а также в отношении международного сотрудничества в этих областях. Неядерные страны также не должны быть подвергнуть дискриминации в любой плоскости этих работ.
Правительство Японии хотело бы подчеркнуть, что оно также будет проявлять глубокую заинтересованность в этих вопросах как при ратификации настоящего договора, так и в случае своего участия в пересмотре осуществления Договора, как его участник.
РАЗОРУЖЕНИЕ И ГАРАНТИИ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
1. Согласно статье 6-й настоящего Договора страна-участник «обязуется в духе доброй воли вести переговоры об эффективных мерах по прекращению гонки ядерных вооружений в ближайшем будущем и ядерному разоружению, а также относительно Договора о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международном контролем». Для осуществления целей настоящего Договора Правительство Японии считает необходимым, чтобы в соответствии с настоящим Договором прежде всего ядерные державы приняли конкретные меры по ядерному разоружению Япония, как страна-участник Комитета по разоружению, также готова сотрудничать в том, чтобы содействовать разоружению.
2. Правительство Японии придает больше значение положению в преамбуле настоящего Договора о том, что «в соответствии с Уставом Организации Объединенных Наций государства должны воздерживаться в своих международных отношениях от угрозы силой или ее применения как против территориальной неприкосновенности или политической независимости любого государства, так и каким-либо другим образом, несовместимым с целями Организации Объединенных Наций», и подчеркивает, что ядерные державы не должны использовать ядерное оружие против неядерных стран или угрожать им ядерным оружием.
3. Равным образом Правительство Японии придает большое значение декларации США, Великобритании и СССР, подтвердивших, что в соответствии с Уставом ООН они намерены немедленно обратиться к Совету Безопасности для того, чтобы оказать помощь неядерным странам, участникам Договора, которые оказались жертвой агрессии с использованием ядерного оружия или объектом угрозы такой агрессии. Вместе с тем правительство Японии желает, чтобы ядерные державы продолжали рассмотрение эффективных мероприятий для обеспечения безопасности неядерных стран.
4. Правительство Японии до ратификации настоящего Договора будет следить за ходом переговоров о разоружении и осуществлением резолюции Совета Безопасности по обеспечению безопасности неядерных стран. Вместе с тем Правительство Японии будет самым внимательным образом продолжать рассмотрение вопросов, заслуживающих изучения с точки зрения обеспечения государственных интересов Японии.
5. Правительство Японии принимает к сведению положения статьи 10 настоящего Договора о том, что «каждый участник настоящего Договора в порядке осуществления своего государственного суверенитета имеет право выйти из Договора, если он решит, что связанные с содержанием настоящего Договора исключительные обстоятельства поставили под угрозу высшие интересы его страны».
ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЕ АТОМНОЙ ЭНЕРГИИ В МИРНЫХ ЦЕЛЯХ
1. Содержание соглашения о гарантиях, которое Япония заключит с Международным агентством по атомной энергии на основании статьи 3 настоящего Договора, не должно быть в сущности невыгодным для Японии по сравнению с тем содержанием соглашений о гарантиях, которые другие государства-участники заключат в индивидуальном порядке или совместно с другими странами с Международным агентством по атомной энергии. Правительство Японии намерено предпринять необходимые процедуры для ратификации настоящего Договора с полным учетом вышеизложенного.
2. Правительство Японии высоко оценивает в качестве дополнений к настоящему Договору заявления Правительств США и Великобритании, обладающих ядерным оружием, в которых сказано, что они примут гарантии Международного агентства по атомной энергии ко всей своей деятельности в области атомной энергии, исключая только те гарантии, которые имеют непосредственное отношение к их государственной безопасности, и выражает глубокую заинтересованность в том, чтобы такие гарантии добросовестно осуществлялись. Правительство Японии также искренне надеется, что другие страны, обладающие ядерным оружием, примут такие же меры.
Гарантии должны соответствовать принципам о том, что они должны применяться на определенных стратегических этапах цикла производства ядерного топлива и процедура их применения должна быть рациональной с точки зрения соотношения издержек к эффективности, а также должна быть как можно более простой, благодаря максимальному использованию системы контроля каждой страны. Кроме того, должны быть приняты соответствующие меры, чтобы обеспечить применение гарантии без обнаружения промышленных секретов и никоим образом не препятствовать промышленной деятельности. Правительство Японии надеется, что Международное агентство по атомной энергии будет прилагать постоянные усилия, чтобы улучшать гарантии в свете технического прогресса, преследуя вышеупомянутые цели. Правительство Японии готово содействовать этим усилиям и надеется, что заинтересованные страны проявят готовность в сотрудничестве по достижению этих целей.
Правительство Японии полагает, что на страны, не обладающие ядерным оружием и в отношении которых будут применены гарантии, не будет наложено никакое несправедливое бремя в связи со стоимостью применения гарантий.
5. Правительство Японии считает, что когда гарантии будут применены в соответствии с соглашением о гарантиях, которые будет заключено между Японией и Международным агентством по атомной энергии на основании статьи 3 настоящего Договора, должны быть приняты меры для замены существующих гарантий, которые применяются в связи с сотрудничеством между Японией и США, Великобританией и Канадой в области мирного применения атомной энергии.
Должны быть приняты конкретные меры, чтобы содействовать выполнению постановлений статей 4 и 5 настоящего Договора, касающихся международного сотрудничества в области мирного использования ядерной энергии и мирного применения ядерных взрывов. В частности, никакая деятельность в области мирного применения ядерной энергии не должна быть запрещена или ограничена для стран, не обладающих ядерным оружием. Кроме того, в отношении неядерных стран не должна запрещаться передача информации, ядерных веществ, оборудования и других материалов, связанных с мирным использованием атомной энергии, лишь на основании того, что такая деятельность или передача может быть использована также для производства ядерного оружия или других ядерных устройств».
«Сегодня правительство Японии сдает на хранение свои документы о ратификации Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, вместе с правительствами Соединенного Королевства, Советского Союза и Соединенных Штатов Япония становится участницей этого Договора.»
Япония как единственная нация, пострадавшая от атомной бомбардировки, последовательно придерживается основ политики отказа от ядерного вооружения и в соответствии со своей Мирной конституцией последовательно осуществляет внешнюю политику миролюбивой нации. По случаю сдачи на хранение ее документов о ратификации этого Договора правительство Японии снова заявляет миру об этой основополагающей политике. Мы твердо убеждены в том, что верность Японии этому Договору будет способствовать стабильности в международных отношениях и, в частности, делу мира и стабильности положения в Азии.
Япония как участница этого Договора полна решимости в будущем умножить свои усилия, чтобы предотвратить распространение ядерного оружия и сделать вклад в международное сотрудничество в отношении мирного использования ядерной энергии. Этот Договор позволяет только «государствам, обладающим ядерным оружием», иметь ядерное оружие и допускает для них специальный статус. Правительство Японии придерживается такого мнения, что в будущем государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, должны исправить это дискриминационное положение путем полного запрещения их ядерного оружия. Для достижения этой цели правительство Японии полно решимости приложить конкретные усилия для ускорения ядерного разоружения.
На основе этих существенных соображений правительство Японии особо подчеркивает следующие пункты:
1. Правительство Японии выражает надежду на то, что как можно большее число стран, как имеющих ядерные взрывные устройства, так и не имеющие их, станут участниками этого Договора, с тем чтобы сделать его поистине эффективным. В частности, оно выражает твердую надежду, что Французская Республика и Китайская Народная Республика, которые имеют ядерное оружие, но не являются участниками этого Договора, присоединятся к нему.
2. Правительство Японии призывает государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, которые имеют особые обязательства в отношении ядерного разоружения, принять конкретные меры в отношении ядерного разоружения, такие, как сокращение ядерного оружия и осуществление всеобщего запрещения испытаний ядерного оружия в соответствии со Статьей VI этого Договора. Правительство призывает государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, которые не являются участниками этого Договора, также принять меры в отношении ядерного разоружения.
3. Правительство Японии особо отмечает заявления, сделанные в июне 1968 года Соединенным Королевством, Советским Союзом и Соединенными Штатами относительно безопасности государств, не обладающих ядерным оружием, а также резолюцию 255 (1968) Совета Безопасности и выражает надежду относительно того, что государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, сделают дальнейшие усилия в отношении принятия эффективных мер безопасности для государств, не имеющих ядерного оружия. Далее, правительство призывает все государства, как обладающие ядерным оружием, так и государства, не обладающие им, в соответствии с Уставом Организации Объединенных Наций воздерживаться от угрозы силой с применением как ядерного, так и неядерного оружия в своих международных отношениях.
4. Правительство Японии убеждено в том, что в соответствии с положениями этого Договора во имя благосостояния всего человечества, международного сотрудничества следует энергично содействовать мирному использованию ядерной энергии и мирному применению ядерных взрывов. Оно считает, что этот Договор ни в коей море не должен быть препятствием для мирной деятельности в области ядерной энергии в государствах-участниках данного Договора, которые не имеют ядерного оружия, а также, что Япония не должна подвергаться дискриминации в пользу других государств-участников этого Договора ни в каких аспектах, связанных с этой деятельностью.
5. Правительство Японии приветствует заявление Соединенного Королевства и Соединенных Штатов, двух государств, обладающих ядерным оружием, относительно того, что они примут применение гарантий Международного агентства по атомной энергии в отношении мирной ядерной деятельности. Оно призывает другие государства, обладающие ядерным оружием, предпринять подобные действия.
6. Правительство Японии выражает надежду в том, что в соответствии с этим Договором конференции по рассмотрению действия Договора будут созываться через определенные промежутки времени с целью обеспечения соответствующего действия данного Договора».
«The Government of Japan, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the danger of nuclear war, has always been in favour of the spirit underlying this Treaty, since the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in accord with its policy with regard to the maintenance of world peace.»
The Government of Japan is signing this Treaty on the basis of the fundamental position which is stated below.
The Government of Japan is convinced that this Treaty will serve as a first step towards nuclear disarmament and hopes that as many States as possible will adhere to this Treaty to make it effective. The Government of Japan hopes, especially, that the Government of the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China which possess nuclear weapons but have yet to express their intention of adhering to this Treaty will become parties thereto at an early date and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament and that they will refrain, even before that, from taking such actions as are contrary to the purposes of this Treaty.
This Treaty permits only the present nuclear-weapon States to possess nuclear weapons. This discrimination should ultimately be made to disappear through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon States from their national arsenals. Until such time the nuclear-weapon States should be conscious of the fact that they have special responsibilities as a consequence of this special status.
The prohibition under this Treaty applies solely to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and of control over them. Therefore, this Treaty must in no way restrict non-nuclear-weapon States in their research, development, or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or in their international cooperation in these fields, nor must it subject them to discriminatory treatment in any aspect of such activities.
The Government of Japan wishes to state that it has a deep interest in the following matters in the light of its basic position stated above.
This Government stresses that it will also concern itself most vigorously with these matters when it decides to ratify the Treaty as well as when it participates in the review of its operation in the future as a party to the Treaty.
1. Under Article VI of the Treaty each State Party 'undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control'. The Government of Japan believes it essential for the attainment of the purposes of this Treaty that, above all, the nuclear-weapon States should take concrete nuclear disarmament measures in pursuance of this undertaking. As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, Japan is also prepared to cooperate in the furtherance of disarmament.
2. The Government of Japan deems it important that in the preamble to the Treaty there is a provision stating that 'in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations'. It also wishes to emphasize that the nuclear-weapon States must not have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
3. The Government of Japan also attaches great importance to the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union affirming their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon State, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will continue their studies with regard to effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.
4. The Government of Japan, pending its ratifications of this Treaty, will pay particular attention to developments in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the Security Council Resolution on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and continue to make a close study of other problems which require consideration for the safeguarding of her national interests.
5. The Government of Japan takes note of the fact that Article X of the Treaty provides that: 'each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country'.
II. Peaceful uses of nuclear energy
1. The safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must not be such as would subject her to disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards agreements which other States Parties conclude with the same Agency, either individually or together with other States. The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration to this matter before taking steps to ratify the Treaty.
2. The Government of Japan greatly appreciates as a measure supplementing this Treaty, the declarations of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which are both nuclear-weapon States, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all their nuclear activities, excluding only those directly related to their national security, and earnestly hopes that these assurances will be faithfully implemented. It also hopes most earnestly that the other nuclear-weapon States will take similar action.
3. Safeguards should be subject to the principle that they should be applied at certain strategic points of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the procedure for their application must be rational when considered from the point of view of cost-effectiveness and made as simple as possible by making the maximum use of material control systems of the respective countries. Furthermore, adequate measures must be taken to ensure that the application of safeguards does not cause the leakage of industrial secrets or otherwise hinder industrial activities. The Government of Japan hopes that the International Atomic Energy Agency will make constant efforts to improve safeguards in the light of technological developments with the above aims in mind. This Government is prepared to cooperate in such efforts and hopes that the States concerned will also cooperate to achieve this end.
4. The Government of Japan understands that no unfair burden in connection with the cost of applying safeguards will be imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon States to which such safeguards are to be applied.
5. The Government of Japan considers that, when safeguards are applied in accordance with the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency under Article III of this Treaty, steps should be taken to arrange that such safeguards supersede the existing safeguards which are being applied in connection with Japan's cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
6. Concrete measures should be taken to promote implementation of the provisions of Articles IV and V of the Treaty relating to International Cooperation for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy and for the Peaceful Application of Nuclear Explosions. In particular, no peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited or restricted, nor shall the transfer of information, nuclear materials, equipment or other material relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy be denied to non-nuclear-weapon States, merely on the grounds that such activities or transfers could be used also for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices».
«Today the Government of Japan is depositing its Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, and Japan becomes a party to this Treaty.»
Japan, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombing, has consistently followed a fundamental policy of forsaking nuclear armament and has steadfastly pursued the foreign policy of a nation committed to peace under its peace constitution. On the occasion of the depositing of its Instruments of Ratification of this Treaty, the Government of Japan declares anew to the world this fundamental policy. It firmly believes that Japan's adherence to this Treaty will contribute to stability in international relations, and, in particular, to peace and stability in Asia.
Japan, as a party to this Treaty, is determined hereafter to intensify its efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to contribute to international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
This Treaty permits only the «nuclear-weapon states» to possess nuclear weapons and allows them a special status. The Government of Japan holds the belief that the nuclear-weapon states must rectify this discrimination in the future by totally abolishing their nuclear weapons. To achieve this end, the Government of Japan is determined to make special efforts for the furthering of nuclear disarmament.
On the basis of these fundamental considerations, the Government of Japan stresses especially the following points:
1. The Government of Japan hopes that as many states as possible, whether possessing a nuclear explosive capability or not, will become parties to this Treaty in order to make it truly effective. In particular, it strongly hopes that the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China, which possess nuclear weapons but are not parties to this Treaty, will accede thereto.
2. The Government of Japan urges the nuclear-weapon states, which have special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, to take concrete nuclear disarmament measures such as the reduction of nuclear arms and the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, in accordance with Article VI of this Treaty. It urges the nuclear-weapon states not party to this Treaty also to take nuclear disarmament measures.
3. The Government of Japan takes particular note of the Declarations in June 1968 of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the security of non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as of Security Council Resolution 255 (1968), and hopes that the nuclear-weapon states will make further efforts towards effective measures for the security of non-nuclear-weapon states. It further urges all states, both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, to refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or use of force in their international relations involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.
4. The Government of Japan is convinced that, for the well-being of all mankind, international cooperation with respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be vigorously promoted in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. It considers that peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty should in no way be hampered by this Treaty and also that Japan should not be discriminated against in favour of other states party to the Treaty in any aspect of such activities.
5. The Government of Japan appreciates the Declarations of the United Kingdom and the United States, both nuclear-weapon states, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to their peaceful nuclear activities. It urges the other nuclear-weapon states to take similar action.
6. The Government of Japan hopes that Review Conferences, as provided for in this Treaty, will continue to be held at regular intervals in order to ensure the appropriate operation of this Treaty».
At the time of signature the Ambassador of Japan presented the Secretary of State the statement issued by the Government of Japan on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty. The text of the statement reads as follows:
«The Government of Japan, believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase the danger of nuclear war, has always been in favour of the spirit underlying this Treaty, since the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in accord with its policy with regard to the maintenance of world peace.»
«The Government of Japan is signing this Treaty on the basis of its fundamental position which is stated below.»
«The Government of Japan is convinced that this Treaty will serve as a first step towards nuclear disarmament and hopes that as many states as possible will adhere to this Treaty to make it effective. The Government of Japan hopes, especially, that the Governments of the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China which possess nuclear weapons but have yet to express their intention of adhering to this Treaty will become parties thereto at an early date and pursue negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament and that they will refrain, even before that, from taking such actions as are contrary to the purposes of this Treaty.»
«This Treaty permits only the present nuclear-weapon states to possess nuclear weapons. This discrimination should ultimately be made to disappear through the elimination of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear-weapon states from their national arsenals. Until such time the nuclear-weapon states should be conscious of the fact that they have special responsibilities as a consequence of this special status.»
«The prohibition under this Treaty applies solely to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and of control over them. Therefore, this Treaty must in no way restrict non-nuclear-weapon states in their research, development, or implementation of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, or in their international cooperation in these fields, nor must it subject them to discriminatory treatment in any aspect of such activities.»
«The Government of Japan wishes to state that it has a deep interest in the following matters in the light of its basic position stated above.»
«This government stresses that it will also concern itself most vigorously with these matters when it decides to ratify the Treaty as well as when it participates in the review of its operation in the future as a party to the Treaty.»
1. Under Article VI of the Treaty each state party «undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.» The Government of Japan believes it essential for the attainment of the purposes of this Treaty that, above all, the nuclear-weapon states should take concrete nuclear disarmament measures in pursuance of this undertaking. As a member of the Committee on disarmament, Japan is also prepared to cooperate in the furtherance of disarmament.
2. The Government of Japan deems it important that in the preamble to the Treaty there is a provision stating that «in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, states must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.» It also wishes to emphasize that the nuclear-weapon states must not have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.
3. The Government of Japan also attaches great importance to the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union affirming their intention to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to any non-nuclear-weapon state, party to the Treaty, that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used, and hopes that the nuclear-weapon states will continue their studies with regard to effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon states.
4. The Government of Japan, pending its ratification of this Treaty, will pay particular attention to developments in disarmament negotiations and progress in the implementation of the Security Council resolution on the security of non-nuclear-weapon states and continue to make a close study of other problems which require consideration for the safeguarding of her national interests.
5. The Government of Japan takes note of the fact that Article X of the Treaty provides that: «each party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.»
«II. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy»
1. The safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with Article III of the Treaty must not be such as would subject her to disadvantageous treatment as compared with the safeguards agreement which other states parties conclude with the same agency, either individually or together with other states. The Government of Japan intends to give full consideration to this matter before taking steps to ratify the Treaty.
2. The Government of Japan greatly appreciates, as a measure supplementing this Treaty, the declarations of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom, which are both nuclear-weapon states, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to all their nuclear activities, excluding only those directly related to their national security, and earnestly hopes that these assurances will be faithfully implemented. It also hopes most earnestly that the other nuclear-weapon states will take similar action.
3. Safeguards should be subject to the principle that they should be applied at certain strategic points of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the procedure for their application must be rational when considered from the point of view of cost-effectiveness and made as simple as possible by making the maximum use of material control systems of the respective countries. Furthermore, adequate measures must be taken to ensure that the application of safeguards does not cause the leakage of industrial secrets or otherwise hinder industrial activities. The Government of Japan hopes that the International Atomic Energy Agency will make constant efforts to improve safeguards in the light of technological developments with the above aims in mind. This government is prepared to cooperate in such efforts and hopes that the states concerned will also cooperate to achieve this end.
4. The Government of Japan understands that no unfair burden in connection with the cost of applying safeguards will be imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon states to which such safeguards are to be applied.
5. The Government of Japan considers that, when safeguards are applied in accordance with the safeguards agreement to be concluded by Japan with the International Atomic Energy Agency under Article III of this Treaty, steps should be taken to arrange that such safeguards supersede the existing safeguards which are being applied in connection with Japan's cooperation with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
6. Concrete measures should be taken to promote the implementation of the provisions of Articles IV and V of the Treaty relating to international cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and for the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. In particular, no peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states shall be prohibited or restricted, nor shall the transfer of information, nuclear materials, equipment, or other material relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy be denied to non-nuclear-weapon states, merely on the grounds that such activities or transfers could be used also for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.»
Today the Government of Japan is depositing its Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, and Japan becomes a party to this Treaty. Japan, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombing, has consistently followed a fundamental policy of forsaking nuclear armament and has steadfastly pursued the foreign policy of a nation committed to peace under its peace constitution. On the occasion of the depositing of its Instruments of Ratification of this Treaty, the Government of Japan declares anew to the world this fundamental policy. It firmly believes that Japan's adherence to this Treaty will contribute to stability in international relations and, in particular, to peace and stability in Asia. Japan, as a party to this Treaty, is determined hereafter to intensify its efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to contribute to international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
This Treaty permits only the «nuclear-weapon States» to possess nuclear weapons and allows them a special status. The Government of Japan holds the belief that the nuclear-weapon states must rectify this discrimination in the future by totally abolishing their nuclear weapons. To achieve this end, the Government of Japan is determined to make special efforts for the furthering of nuclear disarmament. On the basis of these fundamental considerations, the Government of Japan stresses especially the following points:
1. The Government of Japan hopes that as many states as possible, whether possessing a nuclear explosive capability or not, will become parties to this Treaty in order to make it truly effective. In particular, it strongly hopes that the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China, which possess nuclear weapons but are not parties to the Treaty, will accede thereto.
2. The Government of Japan urges the nuclear-weapon states, which have special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, to take concrete nuclear disarmament measures such as the reduction of nuclear arms and the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, in accordance with Article VI of this Treaty. It urges the nuclear-weapon states not party to this Treaty also to take nuclear disarmament measures.
3. The Government of Japan takes particular note of the Declarations in June 1968 of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the security of non-nuclear-weapon-states, as well as of Security Council Resolution 255 (1968), and hopes that the nuclear-weapon states will make further efforts towards effective measures for the security of non-nuclear-weapon states. It further urges all states, both nuclear-weapon-states and non-nuclear-weapon states, to refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or use of force in their international relations involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.
4. The Government of Japan is convinced that, for the well-being of all mankind, international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be vigourously promoted in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. It considers that peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty should in no way be hampered by this Treaty and also that Japan should not be discriminated against in favour of other states party to the Treaty in any aspect of such activities.
5. The Government of Japan appreciates the Declarations of the United Kingdom and the United States, both nuclear-weapon states, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to their peaceful nuclear activities. It urges the other nuclear-weapon states to take similar action.
6. The Government of Japan hopes that Review Conferences, as provided for in this Treaty, will continue to be held at regular intervals in order to ensure the appropriate operation of this Treaty.
The instrument of ratification of the Treaty by Japan was accompanied by a statement by the Government of Japan, a translation of the text of which reads as follows:
«Today the Government of Japan is depositing its instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States, and Japan becomes a party to this treaty.»
«Japan, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bombing, has consistently followed a fundamental policy of forsaking nuclear armament and has steadfastly pursued the foreign policy of a nation committed to peace under its peace constitution. On the occasion of the depositing of its instruments of ratification of this treaty, the Government of Japan declares anew to the world this fundamental policy. It firmly believes that Japan's adherence to this treaty will contribute to stability in international relations, and, in particular, to peace and stability in Asia.»
«Japan, as a party to this treaty, is determined hereafter to intensify its efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to contribute to international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.»
«This treaty permits only the nuclear-weapon states to possess nuclear weapons and allows them a special status. The Government of Japan holds the belief that the nuclear-weapon states must rectify this discrimination in the future by totally abolishing their nuclear weapons. To achieve this end, the Government of Japan is determined to make special efforts for the furthering of nuclear disarmament.»
«On the basis of these fundamental considerations, the Government of Japan stresses especially the following points:»
1. The Government of Japan hopes that as many states as possible, whether possessing a nuclear explosive capability or not, will become parties to this treaty in order to make it truly effective. In particular, it strongly hopes that the Republic of France and the People's Republic of China, which possess nuclear weapons but are not parties to this treaty, will accede thereto.
2. The Government of Japan urges the nuclear-weapon states, which have special responsibilities for nuclear disarmament, to take concrete nuclear disarmament measures such as the reduction of nuclear arms and the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, in accordance with Article VI of this treaty. It urges the nuclear-weapon states not party to this treaty also to take nuclear disarmament measures.
3. The Government of Japan takes particular note of the declarations in June 1968 of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States concerning the security of non-nuclear-weapon states, as well as of Security Council Resolution 255 (1968), and hopes that the nuclear-weapon states will make further efforts towards effective measures for the security of non-nuclear-weapon states. It further urges all states, both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, to refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or use of force in their international relations involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.
4. The Government of Japan is convinced that, for the well-being of all mankind, international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be vigorously promoted in accordance with the provisions of this treaty. It considers that peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states party to the treaty should in no way be hampered by this treaty and also that Japan should not be discriminated against in favor of other states party to the treaty in any aspect of such activities.
5. The Government of Japan appreciates the declarations of the United Kingdom and the United States, both nuclear-weapon states, that they will accept the application of safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency to their peaceful nuclear activities. It urges the other nuclear-weapon states to take similar action.
6. The Government of Japan hopes that review conferences, as provided for in this treaty, will continue to be held at regular intervals in order to ensure the appropriate operation of this treaty.»
The instrument of ratification by Kuwait was accompanied by the following understanding:
«It is understood that the Ratification of the treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons signed by Kuwait on the 15th of August 1968, does not mean in any way a recognition of Israel by the Government of the State of Kuwait.»
«Furthermore, no treaty relations will arise between the State of Kuwait and Israel.»
Recalling that the aim of the Treaty is to prevent those States which do not possess nuclear weapons from manufacturing or acquiring such arms and other nuclear explosive devices, Liechtenstein accedes to the Treaty in the belief that its provisions are directed solely towards the attainment of that aim and will not have the effect of limiting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes.
Availing itself of the opportunity afforded by the deposit of its instruments of accession, Liechtenstein makes the following declaration:
1. Liechtenstein recalls that, according to Article IV, research, production and use for peaceful purposes in the nuclear sector do not come within the scope of the prohibitions in Articles I and II. Such activities include in particular the whole field of energy production and allied operations, research and technology in the sector of future generations of nuclear fission or fusion reactors and the production of isotopes.
2. Liechtenstein defines the expression «source and special fissionable material», used in Article III, in accordance with the present Article XX of the Statute of the IAEA. Any modification of this interpretation requires Liechtenstein's formal approval. It will, furthermore, accept only those interpretations and definitions of the concepts «equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material», mentioned in Article III, paragraph 2, which it has expressly approved.
3. Liechtenstein understands that the application of the Treaty and in particular the control measures will not lead to any discrimination against Liechtenstein industry in international competition.
«1. Лихтенштейн констатирует, что согласно статье IV исследования, производство и использование в мирных целях в ядерной области не входят в рамки запрещений, содержащихся в статьях I и II. Такая деятельность включает в себя, в частности, область производства энергии в комплексе и связанные с этим виды деятельности, исследования и технологию в области новых типов ядерных реакторов делегат или синтеза и производство изотопов.»
2. Лихтенштейн определяет термин «исходный и специальный расщепляющийся материал», применяемый в статье III, в соответствии с нынешней редакцией статьи XX Устава МАГАТЭ Изменение этой интерпретации требует официального согласия Лихтенштейна.
Кроме того, он принимает в целом толкования и определения понятий «оборудование или материал, специально предназначенный или подготовленный для обработки, использования или производства специального расщепляющегося материала», упомянутых в пункте 2 статьи III, которые он должным образом одобрил.
3. Лихтенштейн выражает свое понимание, что применение Договора и, в частности, мер по контролю не приведут к дискриминации лихтенштейнской промышленности в условиях международной конкуренции.
The instrument of accession to the Treaty by Liechtenstein contains a declaration, a translation of the text of which reads as follows:
«Noting that the Treaty is intended to prevent States which do not possess nuclear weapons from producing such weapons and other nuclear explosive devices or acquiring them, Liechtenstein hereby accedes to the Treaty with the view that its provisions are directed exclusively at the achievement of that goal and will not have the effect of limiting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes.»
«Availing itself of this occasion of the deposit of its instrument of accession, Liechtenstein makes the following declaration:»
1. Liechtenstein notes that, according to Article IV, research, production, and use for peaceful purposes in the nuclear sector are not governed by the prohibitions contained in articles I and II. Such activities specifically include the entire field of energy production and related operations, research and technology in the sector of future generations of nuclear fission or fusion reactors, and the production of isotopes.
2. Liechtenstein defines the term «source or special fissionable material,» used in article III, in conformity with the current article XX of the Statute of the IAEA. A modification of this interpretation shall require the formal agreement of Liechtenstein.
Furthermore, Liechtenstein will accept only such interpretations and definitions of the concepts 'equipment or materials specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material,' mentioned in article III(2), as it has expressly approved.
3. Liechtenstein understands that application of the Treaty and particularly the control measures will not lead to discrimination against Liechtenstein industry in international competition.»
The Government of Mexico understands:
1. that, in accordance with what is laid down in Article VII of the Treaty, none of the provisions of the said Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting in any way whatsoever the rights and obligations of Mexico as a State Party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), opened for signature on 14 February, 1967, and concerning which the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December, 1967;
2. that at the present time any nuclear explosive (device) is capable of being used as a nuclear weapon and that there is no indication that in the near future it will be possible to manufacture nuclear explosives (devices) which are not potentially nuclear weapons. However, if technological advances succeeded in modifying this situation, it would be necessary to amend the relevant provisions of the Treaty in accordance with the procedure established therein.
«В соответствии со статьей VII Договора ни одно из положений указанного Договора не должно толковаться как затрагивающее в любой форме какие-либо права или обязанности Мексики как участника Договора о запрещении ядерного оружия в Латинской Америке (Договор Тлателолко), открытый для подписания 14 февраля 1967 года, и в отношении которого Генеральная Ассамблея ООН приняла Резолюцию 2286 (XXII) от 5 декабря 1967 года.»
В настоящее время любое ядерное взрывное устройство может быть использовано в качестве ядерного оружия и нет данных о том, что в ближайшем будущем станет возможным производить ядерные взрывные устройства, которые потенциально не являлись бы ядерным оружием. Однако если технические достижения изменят данную ситуацию, необходимо будет внести поправки в соответствующие положения Договора в соответствии с установленной процедурой».
At the time of signature of the Treaty by Mexico, the Ambassador of Mexico made a statement, by a note to the Secretary of State dated July 26, 1968, a translation of which reads as follows:
«In signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons..., I have the honor to state that the Government of Mexico understands:»
«1. That, in view of Article VII of the Treaty, none of the provisions of the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Mexico as a State Party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty), opened for signature on February 14, 1967, and on which Treaty the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 2286 (XXII) of December 5, 1967; and»
«2. That, at the present time, any nuclear explosive device may be used as a nuclear weapon, and that there is no indication that in the near future it will be possible to manufacture nuclear explosive devices that are not potentially nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, if technological progress should change that situation, it would be necessary to amend the pertinent provisions of the Treaty, in accordance with the procedure established therein.»
«В соответствии с решениями Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и северной Ирландии несет полную ответственность в отношении Южной Родезии, пока народ этой территории не обретет подлинной независимости.»
Исходя из этого, Правительство МНР заявляет, что обязательства, возложенные Договором о нераспространении ядерного оружия на Соединенное Королевство Великобритании и Северной Ирландии, должны распространяться в равной мере на Южную Родезию».
In a Note dated 29 August 2001, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared its succession to the Treaty, with effect from 27 April 1992. As of 4 February 2003 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became known as «Serbia and Montenegro». As of 3 June 2006, the Republic of Serbia became the continuation State of «Serbia and Montenegro»: in a Note dated 12 December 2006, the Government of the Republic of Montenegro confirmed that this Agreement continues in force for the Republic of Montenegro with effect from 3 June, 2006.
The instrument of ratification of the Treaty by the Netherlands states that the Treaty is approved for the Kingdom in Europe, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.
Suriname became an independent state on November 25, 1975.
The Royal Netherlands Embassy in Washington transmitted to the Department of State a diplomatic note, dated January 9, 1986, which reads as follows:
«The Royal Netherlands Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to request the Department's attention for the following with respect to the Department's capacity of depositary of [the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons].»
«Effective January 1, 1986 the island of Aruba — formerly part of the Netherlands Antilles — obtained internal autonomy as a country within the Kingdom of The Netherlands. Consequently the Kingdom of The Netherlands as of January 1, 1986 consists of three countries, to wit: the Netherlands proper, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.»
«Since the abovementioned event concerns only a change in internal constitutional relations within the Kingdom of The Netherlands, and as the Kingdom as such, under international law, will remain the subject with which treaties are concluded, the aforementioned change will have no consequences in international law with regard to treaties concluded by the Kingdom, the application of which (treaties) were extended to the Netherlands Antilles, including Aruba.»
«These treaties, thus, will remain applicable for Aruba in its new status as autonomous country within the Kingdom of The Netherlands effective January 1, 1986.»
«Consequently the [Treaty] to which the Kingdom of the Netherlands is a Party, and which [has] been extended to the Netherlands Antilles will as of January 1, 1986 apply to all three countries of the Kingdom of The Netherlands.»
«The Embassy would appreciate if the other Parties concerned would be notified of the above.»
«The Royal Netherlands Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurance of its highest consideration.»
The Royal Netherlands Embassy in Washington transmitted to the Department of State a diplomatic note, dated October 6, 2010, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
«The Kingdom of the Netherlands currently consists of three parts: the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. The Netherlands Antilles consists of the islands of Curaçao , Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba.»
«With effect from 10 October 2010, the Netherlands Antilles will cease to exist as a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. From that date onwards, the Kingdom will consist of four parts: the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. Curaçao and Sint Maarten will enjoy internal self-government within the Kingdom, as Aruba and, up to 10 October 2010, the Netherlands Antilles do.»
«These changes constitute a modification of the internal constitutional relations within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Kingdom of the Netherlands will accordingly remain the subject of international law with which agreements are concluded. The modification of the structure of the Kingdom will therefore not affect the validity of the international agreements ratified by the Kingdom for the Netherlands Antilles; these agreements will continue to apply to Curaçao and Sint Maarten.»
«The other islands that have until now formed part of the Netherlands Antilles — Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba — will become part of the Netherlands, thus constituting „the Caribbean part of the Netherlands“. The agreements that now apply to the Netherlands Antilles will also continue to apply to these islands; however, the Government of the Netherlands will now be responsible for implementing these agreements.»
Although the United Nations has received a Note Verbale dated 14 February 2019 from the Republic of North Macedonia regarding the name change, the official lists of the depositary countries are yet to reflect the change.
Republic of Korea
The Ambassador of the Republic of Korea informed the Secretary of State in a note dated July 1, 1968, as follows:
«The signing by the Government of the Republic of Korea of the present Treaty does not in any way mean or imply the recognition of any territory or regime which has not been recognized by the Government of the Republic of Korea as a State or Government.»
Russian Federation
The Treaty was signed and ratified by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. By note of January 30, 1992, the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United States of America informed the Department of State that the Russian Federation continues to exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations arising from the Treaty as a nuclear-weapon state. «Accordingly, the Government of the Russian Federation shall perform, in lieu of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the functions of one of the Treaty Depositaries.»
В связи с заявлением Великобритании Министерство иностранных дел СССР 30 декабря 1968 года направило Посольству Великобритании в СССР ноту, в которой от имени Советского Союза, как государства, подписавшего Договор, было сделано следующее заявление:
«Советское правительство придерживается такой точки зрения, что Великобритания, как это неоднократно также отмечалось в решениях Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН, несет всю полноту ответственности в отношении Южной Родезии, пока народ этой территории не обретет подлинной независимости. Это целиком распространяется и на упомянутый договор».
San Marino
The Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of San Marino, in a note dated September 9, 1968, made a statement on behalf of the Government of San Marino, a translation of which reads as follows:
«... in the event that no act of recognition as prescribed by international law has taken place between the Republic of San Marino and another State, the signing of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by such other State or Government, or the deposit by it of its instrument of ratification, or the notification of such acts by a depositary State, does not imply recognition of that State or of that Government by the Government of San Marino.»
Serbia
Effective date of succession to the Treaty by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is April 27, 1992; the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Treaty on July 10, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification, with a declaration, on March 4, 1970. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro on February 4, 2003.
In a Note dated 29 August 2001, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared its succession to the Treaty, with effect from 27 April 1992. As of 4 February 2003 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became known as «Serbia and Montenegro.»
In a Note dated 8 June 2006, the Embassy of the Republic of Serbia stated as follows; «... the President of the Republic of Serbia, H.E Mr Boris Tadic, notified on 3 June 2006 the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the membership of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro in the United Nations, including all organs and organisations of the United Nations system, is continued by the Republic of Serbia on the basis of Article 60 of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro, activated by the Declaration of Independence adopted by the National Assembly of Montenegro on June 3, 2006. Consequently, the Republic of Serbia is continuing the membership of the state union of Serbia and Montenegro in the... Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968. Therefore, please note that the name „Republic of Serbia“ is to be henceforth used instead of the name „Serbia and Montenegro“ in connection with the... Treaty»
Slovakia
Notification of succession by the Slovak Republic to the Treaty received on January 1, 1993 and effective on that date; the former Czechoslovakia signed the Treaty on July 1, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification on July 22, 1969. On December 31, 1992, at midnight, Czechoslovakia ceased to exist and was succeeded by two separate and independent states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
In a Note dated 15 April 1993, received on 17 April 1993 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic notified the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the following:
In accordance with relevant principles and norms of international law and to the extent defined by it, the Slovak Republic as a successor state of the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic considers itself bound as of January 1, 1993, i.e. the date of division of the CSFR, by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and act in conformity with its articles calling on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons.
In order to ensure the continuous implementation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in relation between the Slovak Republic and other parties to the Treaty, the Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Slovak Republic requests the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in its capacity as depository state to communicate this information as soon as possible to the parties to the NPT.
Slovenia
Date of receipt of notification of succession by Slovenia. The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Treaty on July 10, 1968 and deposited an instrument of ratification, with a declaration, on March 4, 1970.
Sudan
Sudan signed the Treaty at Moscow on December 24, 1968.
Suriname
By virtue of a note dated June 10, 1976, from the Ministry of General and Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Suriname to the Embassy of the United States of America at Paramaribo, the Government of the Republic of Suriname is deemed to have succeeded to the treaty rights and obligations of the Kingdom of the Netherlands arising from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in accordance with customary international law.
Sweden
Switzerland
On the occasion of the signature today of the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Swiss Government expressly declare that they will not submit the Treaty to Parliament for its approval until such time as they consider that a sufficient measure of universal support has been obtained by the Treaty.
The Swiss Government also reserve the right to make such declarations as they shall deem necessary at the time of the deposit of their instrument of ratification.
Declaration on ratification (translation):
Recalling that the aim of the Treaty is to prevent those States which do not possess nuclear weapons from manufacturing or acquiring such arms and other nuclear explosive devices, Switzerland ratifies the Treaty in the belief that its provisions are directed solely towards the attainment of that aim and will not have the effect of limiting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes.
Availing itself of the opportunity afforded by the deposit of its instruments of ratification, Switzerland makes the following declaration:
1. Switzerland recalls that, according to Article IV, research, production and use for peaceful purposes in the nuclear sector do not come within the scope of the prohibitions in Articles I and II. Such activities include in particular the whole field of energy production and allied operations, research and technology in the sector of future generations of nuclear fission or fusion reactors and the production of isotopes.
2. Switzerland defines the expression «source and special fissionable material», used in Article III, in accordance with the present Article XX of the Statute of the IAEA. Any modification of this interpretation requires Switzerland's formal approval. It will, furthermore, accept only those interpretations and definitions of the concepts «Equipment or material specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material», mentioned in Article III, paragraph 2, which it has expressly approved.
3. Switzerland understands that the application of the Treaty and in particular the control measures will not lead to any discrimination against Swiss industry in international competition.
Swaziland signed the Treaty at London on June 24, 1969.
In a note dated November 27, 1969, the Swiss Government made a declaration, a translation of which reads as follows:
«On the occasion of the signing, on today's date, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Swiss Government expressly declares that it will not submit the Treaty to the Parliament for approval until it considers that a sufficient degree of universality has been reached.»
«The Swiss Government, moreover, reserves the right to make whatever statements appear necessary at the time of the deposit of the instrument of ratification.»
The instrument of ratification of the Treaty by Switzerland contains a declaration, a translation of the text of which reads as follows:
«Noting that the Treaty is intended to prevent States which do not possess nuclear weapons from producing such weapons and other nuclear explosive devices or acquiring them, Switzerland hereby ratifies the Treaty with a view that its provisions are directed exclusively at the achievement of that goal and will not have the effect of limiting the use of nuclear energy for other purposes.»
«Availing itself of this occasion of the deposit of its instruments of ratification, Switzerland makes the following declaration:»
1. Switzerland notes that, according to Article IV, research, production, and use for peaceful purposes in the nuclear sector are not governed by the prohibitions contained in articles I and II. Such activities specifically include the entire field of energy production and related operations, research and technology in the sector of future generations of nuclear fission or fusion reactors, and the production of isotopes.
2. Switzerland defines the term «source or special fissionable material,» used in article III, in conformity with the current article XX of the Statute of the IAEA. A modification of this interpretation shall require the formal agreement of Switzerland.
Furthermore, Switzerland will accept only such interpretations and definitions of the concepts «equipment or materials specially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material,» mentioned in article III(2), as it has expressly approved.
3. Switzerland understands that application of the Treaty and particularly the control measures will not lead to discrimination against Swiss industry in international competition.»
Syrian Arab Republic
«Принятие Договора Сирийской Арабской Республикой и ратификация его Правительством Сирийской Арабской Республики никоим образом не предполагает признания Израиля, как и не влечет за собой вступления с ним в отношения, предусматриваемые его положениями».
Tonga
In a Note addressed to the Government of the United Kingdom dated 22 June, 1971, the Government of Tonga declared that it considers itself bound by the Treaty.
The Tonga High Commission in London transmitted to the American Ambassador by note dated July 7, 1971, a note dated June 22, 1971, from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Tonga stating as follows:
«The Government of Tonga has examined the Treaty... and declares that it considers itself bound by virtue of the signature of the United Kingdom and pursuant to customary internatonal law. I would therefore request you to consider listing Tonga as a party to this instrument.»
Turkiye
«In voting in favour of the Treaty on 12 June 1968 at the 22nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly and in signing the Treaty on 28 January 1969, the Turkish Government indicated its intention for eventual ratification.»
The Turkish Government is convinced that the Treaty is the most important multilateral arms control agreement yet concluded. By reducing the danger of a nuclear war, it greatly contributes to the process of detente, international security and disarmament.
Turkey believes that her adherence would further the universality of the Treaty and strengthen international nuclear non-proliferation system. It is, however, evident that cessation of the continuing arms race and preventing war technology from reaching dangerous dimensions for the whole of mankind can only be realised through the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Furthermore, Turkey would like to underline the non-proliferation obligations of the nuclear-weapon states under relevant paragraphs of the preamble and Article VI of the Treaty. Proliferation of all kinds must be halted and measures must be taken to meet adequately the security requirements of non-nuclear-weapon states.
Continuing absence of such assurances might have consequences that could undermine the objectives and the provisions of the Treaty.
Having included nuclear energy in its development plan as one of the sources of electricity production, Turkey is prepared, as stipulated in Article IV of the Treaty, to cooperate further with the technologically advanced states, on a non-discriminatory basis, in the field of nuclear research and development as well as in nuclear energy production. Measures developed or to be developed at national and international levels to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should in no case restrict the non-nuclear weapon states in their options for the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.»
«Правительство Турецкой Республики решило депонировать сегодня грамоту о ратификации Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия.»
Голосуя за Договор 12 июня 1968 г. на 22-й сессии Генеральной Ассамблеи Организации Объединенных Наций и подписывая Договор 28 января 1969 г., Турецкое Правительство выразило свое намерение в отношении возможной ратификации.
Турецкое Правительство убеждено, что Договор является наиболее важным многосторонним соглашением по контролю над вооружениями из всех пока заключенных. Уменьшая опасность ядерной войны, он вносит огромный вклад в процесс разрядки, международной безопасности и разоружения.
Турция считает, что ее присоединение послужит дальнейшему развитию универсальности Договора и укрепит систему нераспространения ядерного оружия. Является, однако, очевидным, что прекращение продолжающейся гонки вооружений и предотвращение такого развития ядерной технологии, которое было бы опасным для всего человечества, может быть реализовано только посредством заключения договора о всеобщем и полном разоружении под строгим и эффективным международным контролем. Более того, Турция хотела бы подчеркнуть обязательства по нераспространению, которые несут ядерные державы в силу соответствующих параграфов преамбулы и статьи VI Договора. Любое распространение должно быть остановлено и должны быть предприняты меры для адекватного удовлетворения потребностей безопасности неядерных государств. Сохраняющееся отсутствие соответствующих заверений может повлечь такие последствия, которые способны подрывать цели и положения Договора»
Включив ядерную энергию в план своего развития в качестве одного из источников производства электроэнергии, Турция готова, как это предусмотрено в статье VI Договора, к дальнейшему сотрудничеству с технологически развитыми странами на недискриминационной основе в сфере ядерных исследований и развития, так же, как и в области производства ядерной энергии. Меры, предпринятые или которые будут предприняты на национальном и международном уровнях для обеспечения нераспространения ядерного оружия, ни в коем случае не должны ограничивать неядерные государства в их мероприятиях по применению ядерной энергии в мирных целях».
«The Government of the Republic of Turkey decided to deposit today the instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.»
In voting in favor of the Treaty on 12 June 1968 at the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly and in signing the Treaty on 28 January 1969, the Turkish Government indicated its intention for eventual ratification.
The Turkish Government is convinced that the Treaty is the most important multilateral arms control agreement yet concluded. By reducing the danger of a nuclear war, it greatly contributed to the process of detente, international security and disarmament.
Turkey believes that her adherence would further the universality of the Treaty and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation system. It is however evident that cessation of the continuing arms race and preventing the war technology from reaching dangerous dimensions for the whole of mankind can only be realized through the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Furthermore, Turkey would like to underline the non-proliferation obligations of the nuclear-weapon States under relevant paragraphs of the Preamble and Article VI of the Treaty. Proliferation of all kinds must be halted and measures must be taken to meet adequately the security requirements of non-nuclear-weapon States. Continuing absence of such assurances might have such consequences that may undermine the objectives and the provisions of the Treaty.
Having included nuclear energy in its development plan as one of the sources of electricity production, Turkey is prepared, as stipulated in Article IV of the Treaty, to cooperate further with the technologically advanced States, on a non-discriminatory basis, in the field of nuclear research and development as well as in nuclear energy production. Measures developed or to be developed at national and international levels to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should in no case restrict the non-nuclear-weapon States in their options for the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes».
The instrument of ratification of the Treaty by Turkey is accompanied by a statement, the text of which reads as follows:
«The Government of the Republic of Turkey decided to deposit today the instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.»
«In voting in favour of the Treaty on June 12, 1968 at the 22nd session of the United Nations General Assembly and in signing the Treaty on January 28, 1969, the Turkish Government indicated its intention for eventual ratification.»
«The Turkish Government is convinced that the Treaty is the most important multilateral arms control agreement yet concluded. By reducing the danger of a nuclear war, it greatly contributed to the process of detente, international security and disarmament.»
«Turkey believes that her adherence would further the universality of the Treaty and strengthen international nuclear non-proliferation system. It is however evident that cessation of the continuing arms race and preventing the war technology from reaching dangerous dimensions for the whole mankind can only be realised through the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Furthermore, Turkey would like to underline the non-proliferation obligations of the nuclear-weapon states under relevant paragraphs of the Preamble and Article VI of the Treaty. Proliferation of all kinds must be halted and measures must be taken to meet adequately the security requirements of non-nuclear weapon states. Continuing absence of such assurances might have such consequences that may undermine the objectives and the provisions of the Treaty.»
«Having included nuclear energy in its development plan as one of the sources of electricity production, Turkey is prepared as stipulated in Article IV of the Treaty, to cooperate further with the technologically advanced states, on a non-discriminatory basis, in the field of nuclear research and development as well as in nuclear energy production. Measures developed or to be developed at national and international levels to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons should in no case restrict the non-nuclear weapon states in their options for the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.»
Ukraine
«1. Положения Договора не охватывают в полной мере уникальной ситуации, которая сложилась вследствие распада ядерной державы — Союза ССР.»
2. Украина является собственником ядерного оружия, унаследованного ей от бывшего СССР после разукомплектования и уничтожения этого оружия под контролем Украины и в соответствии с процедурами, которые исключают возможность повторного использования ядерных материалов, которые являются компонентом этого оружия по первоначальному предназначению. Украина имеет намерение использовать вышеуказанные материалы исключительно в мирных целях.
3. Наличие на территории Украины ядерного оружия до его полной ликвидации, а также соответственно работа по его содержанию, обслуживанию и уничтожению не противоречит положениям статей 1 и 2 Договора.
4. Угроза силой или ее применения против территориальной целостности и неприкосновенности границ или политической независимости Украины со стороны какой-либо ядерной державы, также как и применение экономического давления, направленного на то, чтобы подчинить своей собственной интерпретации реализацию Украиной прав, присущих ее суверенитету будет рассматриваться Украиной, как исключительные обстоятельства, которые поставили под угрозу ее наивысшие интересы.
5. Документы о присоединении Украины к Договору будут переданы государствам — депозитариям Договора после вступления в силу этого закона.
6. Этот закон вступит в силу после предоставления Украине ядерными державами гарантий безопасности, оформленных путем подписания соответствующего международно-правового документа».
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Statement communicated by Her Majesty's Government on 3 July 1968, to all States recognised by the United Kingdom:
«The Government of the United Kingdom wish to recall their view that if a regime is not recognised as the Government of a State, neither signature nor the deposit of any instrument by it, nor notification of any of those acts will bring about recognition of that regime by any other State.»
Statement communicated by Her Majesty's Government on ratification of the Treaty by the United Kingdom on 27 November 1968, to all States recognised by the United Kingdom:
«The provisions of the Treaty shall not apply in regard to Southern Rhodesia unless and until the Government of the United Kingdom informs the other depository Governments that it is in a position to ensure that the obligations imposed by the Treaty in respect of that territory can be fully implemented.»
In a note to the German Democratic Republic dated 6 January 1976, the United Kingdom Government, following consultations with the Governments of the French Republic and the United States of America, stated on behalf of all three Governments:
«The German Democratic Republic is not a Party to the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971, concluded in Berlin by the Governments of the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, and is not therefore competent to comment authoritatively on its provisions.»
The views of the three Governments on the substance of this matter are already set out in a Note dated 30 July 1975 circulated by the State Department of the United States to States which have, in Washington, signed or acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A copy of that Note is enclosed herewith for information.»
Copy of State Department Note: «Following consultations between the Government of the United States of America and the Governments of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Acting Secretary of State wishes to state the following on behalf of all three Governments:»
In a communication to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is an integral part (Annex IV A) of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, the three powers confirmed that, provided matters of security and status are not affected and provided the extension is specified in each case, international agreements and arrangements entered into by the Federal Republic of Germany may be extended to the Western Sectors of Berlin in accordance with established procedures. For its part, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in a communication to the Governments of the three powers, which is similarly an integral part (Annex IV B) of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971, affirmed that it would raise no objection to such extension.
The established procedures referred to above, which were endorsed in the Quadripartite Agreement, are designed, inter alia, to afford the authorities of the three powers the opportunity to ensure that the treaties concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany which are to be extended to the Western Sectors of Berlin are extended in such a way that matters of security and status are not affected. When authorizing the extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to the Western Sectors of Berlin, the authorities of the three powers, acting in the exercise of their supreme authority, took the necessary steps to ensure in accordance with established procedures that this treaty is applied in the Western Sectors of Berlin only in such a way asnot to affect matters of security and status. Thus the extension of this treaty to the Western Sectors of Berlin is entirely consistent with the Quadripartite Agreement.»
In a Note to the Hungarian People's Republic, following consultations with the Governments of the French Republic and the United States of America, the United Kingdom stated on behalf of the three Governments: «The Hungarian People's Republic is not a Party to the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971, concluded in Berlin by the Governments of the French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, and is not therefore competent to comment authoritatively on its provisions.»
The views of the three Governments on the substance of this matter are already set out in a Note dated 30 July 1975 circulated by the State Department of the United States to states which have, in Washington, signed or acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.»
Statement by a Note dated 30 June 1976 concerning the statement made by the Italian Government on ratification:
«The Government of the United Kingdom, as a state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, take the view that the obligations in Articles I and II of the Treaty apply without any distinction to all nuclear explosive devices. They are accordingly unable to agree with the interpretation of the Treaty, and of those Articles in particular, contained in paragraph 87 of the Note of the Italian Embassy.»
The instrument of ratification by the United Kingdom states that the Treaty is ratified in respect of «the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Associated States (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla and Saint Lucia) and Territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom, as well as the State of Brunei, the Kingdom of Tonga and the British Solomon Islands Protectorate».
The British Chargé d'Affaires ad interim made the following declaration in a note to the Secretary of State dated November 27, 1968:
«Acting on instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs I hereby declare that the provisions of the Treaty shall not apply in regard to Southern Rhodesia unless and until the Government of the United Kingdom informs the other depository Governments that it is in a position to ensure that the obligations imposed by the Treaty in respect of that territory can be fully implemented.»
The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Cameroon informed the Department of State by a note dated April 24, 1969, that «The Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon is unable to accept the reservation made by the Government of the United Kingdom... regarding its dependent territory of Southern Rhodesia. It is... the position of the Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon that the Government of the United Kingdom, being the lawful Government of Rhodesia, remains responsible for the implementation of the obligations imposed by this Treaty as well as other International Treaties and conventions until that territory is granted independence in accordance with the United Nations Resolution 2379 (XXIII).»
By note dated June 11, 1997, the Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland informed the Secretary of State as follows:
«I am instructed by Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to refer to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons done at London/Moscow/Washington on 1 July 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the „Treaty“) which applies to Hong Kong at present.»
«I am also instructed to state that, in accordance with the Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong signed on 19 December 1984, the Government of the United Kingdom will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China with effect from 1 July 1997. The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to have international responsibility for Hong Kong until that date. Therefore, from that date the Government of the United Kingdom will cease to be responsible for the international rights and obligations arising from application of the Treaty to Hong Kong.»
«I should be grateful if the contents of this Note could be placed formally on record and brought to the attention of the other Parties to the Treaty.»
«I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.»
«Положения этого Договора не будут применяться в отношении Южной Родезии до тех пор, пока Правительство Соединенного Королевства не сообщит другим правительствам-депозитариям, что оно в состоянии обеспечить положение, при котором обязательства, налагаемые Договором в отношении этой территории, могут быть полностью осуществлены».
«With a declaration that the provisions of the Treaty shall not apply in regard to Southern Rhodesia unless and until the Government of the United Kingdom informs the other depositary Governments that it is in a position to ensure that the obligations imposed by the Treaty in respect of that territory can be fully implemented».
United Republic of Tanzania
Viet Nam
«Социалистическая Республика Вьетнам приветствует и выражает уважение ко всем эффективным международным мерам, направленным на постепенное устранение опасности ядерной войны, и прежде всего к мерам, гарантирующим безопасность государств, не обладающих ядерным оружием, от агрессии или угрозы агрессии с использованием ядерного оружия.
»
Социалистическая Республика Вьетнам считает, что в соответствии с целями и принципами, изложенными в преамбуле Договора, а также в Уставе Организации Объединенных Наций, все государства пользуются равными правами в развитии исследования, производства и использования ядерной энергии в мирных целях, как и в осуществлении своего законного права на самооборону».