Between 1988 and 1992 the applicant spent part of the night at the police station on six occasions. On five of those occasions she went there of her own accord, before or after midnight, and the last time she was taken there after a telephone call from a hotel employee at 2.39 a.m. Each time the applicant was conspicuously intoxicated, manifestly agitated and violent, and, on three occasions at least, refused to leave when requested to do so. For us it is obvious that in her condition the police could not throw her out, causing her to spend the night - in winter - on the street. On the contrary, we consider that the responsibilities arising from the State's positive obligations to protect life and health compelled the police to take the precautionary safety measures which form the subject of the applicant's complaint.
We also do not share the view that the legal regulation of detention for such situations was insufficient. There were legal rules in Article 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in Articles 2 and 3 of the Reykjavik Police Ordinance. Iceland is a small and compact society and the applicant was a national of that state and resident of Reykjavik. She was expected to be familiar with local rules and practices of their application.
The administrative practice was well settled, stable and should have been known and foreseeable to all local reasonable citizens. This clearly enables also the applicant to assume that her (repeated) disorderly conduct could lead to her arrest. The decision of the police in all cases to commit the applicant to detention was in conformity with generally recognized professional rules of police personnel and were based on the role and duty of the police to maintain law and order.
In our opinion, in circumstances like those of the present case, it was not even necessary to determine whether the applicant's "detention" (we would say "safekeeping") was lawful. In any event it was not arbitrary and the main criterion should rather be that of necessity (a few hours of sleep required to sober up). The 1988 provisions (Rule A1) forms a not open to doubt legal basis for police action if "the condition of the person in question is such as to be a danger to himself or to others... if... allowed to remain free. Or if a person, as a result of the use of alcohol or other intoxicating substances... causes... disorder". Any arbitrary act could not have begun until the situation of danger or necessity had ended, and that was not the case, since on each occasion the applicant was sent home as soon as morning came, after she had sobered up.
In conclusion we find the relevant legal rules clear and adequate: they were published and accessible and were prudently and not arbitrarily applied to the applicant. Accordingly, in the circumstances of the case, no issue of foreseeability could arise for a citizen of average responsibility.