Thus, surely, someone like Kemal {Kilic}, who was living in the region, carrying on a profession which he said put him at risk (he was a journalist) and feeling threatened - not even he could say by whom - should have exercised greater care than others and taken his own safety precautions rather than wait for the authorities to protect him against those dangers.
While, according to the findings of the Commission, Kemal {Kilic} was aware of the risk he was running, he nonetheless chose to take the coach home at 5.30 p.m. on 18 February 1993 although it was already dark and an allegedly suspicious car had been spotted following the coach. Without taking any precautions, he got off at a deserted stop where there was no one to come to his aid if necessary.
Unfortunately, no government is able to make security agents available to accompany persons who feel threatened or to provide them with personal protection in a high-risk area where perhaps hundreds or even thousands of people are in a like situation.
Consequently, I do not share the opinion that the respondent State failed, in breach of Article 2 of the Convention, in any duty it had to protect Kemal {Kilic's} life.
2.
As regards the finding of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention, I refer to my dissenting opinion in the case of Ergi v. Turkey (judgment of 28 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV).
Thus, I agree with the Commission that once the conclusion has been reached that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention on the grounds that there was no effective investigation into the death that has given rise to the complaint, no separate question arises under Article 13. The fact that there was no satisfactory and adequate investigation into the death which resulted in the applicant's complaints, both under Article 2 and Article 13, automatically means that there was no effective remedy before a national court. On that subject, I refer to my dissenting opinion in the case of Kaya v. Turkey (judgment of 19 February 1998, Reports 1998-I) and the opinion expressed by the Commission with a large majority (see the opinions of the Commission annexed to the following judgments: Aytekin v. Turkey, 23 September 1998, Reports 1998-VII; Ergi cited above; and {Yasa} v. Turkey, 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI).
3.
The Court awarded the applicant 15,000 pounds sterling (GBP) "in respect of his brother... by way of compensation for non-pecuniary damage... which sum is to be held by the applicant for his brother's heirs".
The actio popularis is excluded under the Convention system, with all the consequences that logically follow. It is for that reason that the Court has up till now awarded compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage for individual violations only to very close relatives such as the surviving spouse or children of the deceased person or, exceptionally, when it has appeared equitable, the father or mother if an express claim has been made (see paragraph 105 of the judgment in the instant case and {Tanrikulu} v. Turkey [GC], No. 23763/94, § 138, ECHR 1999-IV).
It is completely alien and contrary to the Convention system and devoid of any legal justification for an abstract, anonymous and undefined group (perhaps very distant heirs) that has suffered no non-pecuniary damage as a result of the violations found to be awarded compensation.
Kemal {Kilic} was single. He had no companion or children and therefore no heirs deserving compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Yet, even more surprisingly, the Court awarded the applicant's brother the sum of GBP 2,500 for non-pecuniary damage (see paragraph 106 of the judgment). As one of the deceased's heirs, that brother will also receive part of the award of GBP 15,000. He will thus receive two lots of compensation for the same loss, a fact that goes to highlight the inequitable nature of the Court's decision in this case.
4.
Before closing, I feel bound to express my views on what I consider to be an important point. In cases where the presumed offender is a State agent, he may only be prosecuted if the administrative body (the "administrative council") has given prior authorisation. However, that body is, by law, made up of public servants and is neither independent nor impartial. The Court, whose view I agree with entirely, has consistently criticised the Turkish government for that state of affairs.
However, the Court's inadmissibility decision of 5 October 1999 in Grams v. Germany ((dec.), No. 33677/96, ECHR 1999-VII) is instructive on the point. The case concerned the death of a presumed member of the Red Army Faction. The Court noted that the Schwerin public prosecutor's office had decided to drop the prosecution on the ground that the police officers had fired in lawful self-defence and Grams had committed suicide by shooting himself in the head. In arriving at that conclusion, the public prosecutor's office had relied on a 210-page report (Abschlussvermerk) in which the special unit responsible for the investigation of the case had set out its findings. What is interesting in this example - and it will be noted in passing that the application was not even communicated to the Government - is that the investigation was conducted not by a judicial body but by a special unit, that is to say a purely administrative body.